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SHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: THE
EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS*
Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko**

ABSTRACT

In Europe, important developments such as the entering into force
of the Treaty of Lisbon—which placed the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union at the very top of the hierarchy of norms—and the
direct applicability by national courts of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) in private law disputes have been highly influential
for the rise in human rights reasoning by courts deciding intellectual
property (IP) issues. The envisaged E.U. accession to the ECHR is likely to
increase this process further.
This article reflects on these developments by studying the role of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) in
shaping European intellectual property standards. It presents an updated
and modified version of the chapter entitled “Intellectual Property Before
the European Court of Human Rights,” published by the authors in 2018,
and provides the first comprehensive overview of ECtHR case law on IP
from the court’s inception in January 1959 until today, March 2020. The
article results from an analysis of more than ninety such cases, many of
which have never been discussed before in the literature. Certain issues that
are currently pending before the Strasbourg Court are also given exposure.
The article spans subjects from the protection of the rights of IP
holders under the property provision of the ECHR to the possibility of
restricting such protection on the basis of the right to freedom of expression
and information often invoked by the users of IP-protected content. It also
analyzes the situations in which freedom of expression was invoked by the
(actual or potential) IP holders themselves in order, for instance, to insure
This article is an extended and updated version of an earlier work published by the authors
that appeared as Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the
European Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018).
Christophe Geiger is a Professor of Law and Director of the Research Department of the
Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) at the University of Strasbourg
(Strasbourg, France); Affiliated Senior Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation
and Competition (Munich, Germany); and Spangenberg Fellow in Law & Technology at the
Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the Arts at the Case Western Reserve University
School of Law (Cleveland, US). Elena Izyumenko is a Researcher at the CEIPI at the
University of Strasbourg (Strasbourg, France).
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that their trademark applications are registered. The potential of the right
to privacy to serve both as a defense against certain IP enforcement
measures—such as search orders—and as a basis for the protection of moral
rights of creators is likewise discussed. The article further reviews the most
prominent IP disputes which raised questions under the right to nondiscrimination and the right to a fair trial.
This comprehensive overview of the case law of the ECtHR shows
the emergence of a human rights framework for the intellectual property
system in Europe, which—in combination with the increasing use of
fundamental rights by national courts to solve private-party disputes—is
gaining coherence and relevance in framing the conception and use of IP
law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ECtHR is a supranational European tribunal setting the
standards of human rights (HRs) protection in Europe. All states that are
members to the Council of Europe 1 are signatories of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 2 and, as a result, have to comply
with the decisions of this court. 3 In this sense, the ECtHR is comparable to
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on issues of federal law that apply to both
the United States as a whole and to the fifty states individually. Unlike the
U.S. Supreme Court, however, the ECtHR is a specialized human rights
court, expressly concerned with Member States’ compliance with the rights
set in the ECHR, rights such as freedom of expression, right to property,
privacy, and fair trial. Human rights, as a branch of international law, are
The Council of Europe is an international organization of forty-seven members whose
purpose is to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
As of March 2020, Council of Europe counts forty-seven members.
1

2

3
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much more influential in Europe than in the United States, which
reluctantly accepts legal standards set outside of its own Congress or courts. 4
Nevertheless, in the United States, the rights analogous to those found in
the ECHR are often granted through the U.S. Constitution. For instance,
Article 10 of the ECHR, which deals with freedom of expression, is
comparable with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly,
Article 6 of the ECHR, guaranteeing fair trials, is consistent with the Due
Process Clauses found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.
Human (or constitutional) rights and intellectual property have
been and continue to be thought of as independent areas of the law that
hardly interoperate, despite much literature detailing their numerous
interactions over the past couple of decades. 5 More recently, however,
discussions on the impact of intellectual property law on human and
constitutional rights (and vice versa) have spilled over into academic
textbooks and articles. Notably, both legislators and courts have started to
pay attention to the many facets of the interplay between human rights and
IP—a phenomenon that has sometimes been characterized as the
“constitutionalization” of the IP legal system. 6
The United States, for example, has never proceeded with ratification of the American
Convention on Human Rights—an American analogue of the ECHR. Another principal
instrument of the international human rights protection, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), albeit ratified by the United States in 1992, has faced so many
reservations, understandings, and declarations that some have doubted its remaining ability
to have any impact domestically. See, e.g., Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary: Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PAPERS PROJECT, https://www2.gwu.edu/
~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/cov-civilpol-rights.cfm [https://perma.cc/GD8T-8ZXH] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2020).
See, e.g., LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011); Daniel J. Gervais,
Human Rights and the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89 (Christophe Geiger ed.,
2015); Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and Fundamental Rights: Do They
Interoperate?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BEYOND RIGHTS 197 (Niklas Bruun ed., 2005);
Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 709 (2007); Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property
Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger,
“Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?]; Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property—An Update, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul Torremans ed., 4th ed. forthcoming 2020)
[hereinafter Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual
Property]; Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and
Cooperating, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (Paul Torremans ed.,
2d ed. 2008).
For further discussion, see Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra
note 5; Mylly, supra note 5, at 103; Jens Schovsbo, Constitutional Foundations and
4

5

6
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In the United States, the Supreme Court has rendered important
decisions assessing compliance of the Copyright Term Extension Act and
the subsequent Act restoring copyright protection to certain works that have
already lapsed into the public domain under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 7 Lately, certain trademark registration restrictions,
contained in the Lanham Act, have even been found incompatible with the
First Amendment. 8 On a more fundamental level, the standards of
intellectual property protection in the United States have frequently been
assessed against the public interest goal set in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, which
famously states that “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries” should be
conditioned on the “promot[ion] [of] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”. 9
In the European Union, important developments, such as the
entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 placed human rights and
Constitutionalization of IP Law—A Tale of Different Stories?, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT

FU�R
GEISTIGES EIGENTUM INTELL. PROP. J. 383 (2015); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko,
The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the E.U. and the Funke Medien,
Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, But Still Some Way to Go!,
51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 282 (2020).
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)
(invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, the Lanham Act’s restrictions on the registration
of the so-called “disparaging” and “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks).
See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. V.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) (“We have often recognized the
monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature
and must ultimately serve the public good.”) (emphasis added); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954)) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science
and useful Arts.’”) (emphasis added); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing
that there are situations in which strict enforcement of copyright monopolies “would inhibit
the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is intended to promote”); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It is to be
noted . . . that the reward to inventors is wholly secondary, the aim and purpose of patent
statutes being limited by the Constitution to the promotion of the progress of science and
useful arts.”); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) (“The
patentee, like these other holders of an exclusive privilege granted in furtherance of a public
policy [trademark and copyright holders], may not claim protection of his grant by the courts
where it is being used to subvert that policy.”).
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306/01).
7
8

9

10
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fundamental freedoms at the very top of the hierarchy of norms. 11 Since
then, there has been a considerable rise in the use of human rights
arguments in decisions on matters of intellectual property law in the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Luxemburg Court). 12
On the consequences for intellectual property, see Christophe Geiger, Intellectual
“Property” After the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in the New European
Legal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 255 (2010); Christophe Geiger, The
Construction of Intellectual Property in the European Union: Searching for Coherence, in
11

1 CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW
PERSPECTIVES 5 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2013).
In the field of copyright and related rights, see: Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW
GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=203686; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1950544; Case C-516/17, Spiegel
Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=1951971; Case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Renckhoff (Aug. 7, 2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=204738&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1952679;
Case
C-484/14,
McFadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Germany GmbH (Sept. 15, 2016), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183363&pageIndex=0&doclang=
EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1953592; Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v.
Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (Sept. 8, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183124&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=1954218; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (Sept. 3, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157281&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1955429; Case C-314/12, UPC
Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1955995; Case C-360/10, SABAM
v. Netlog (Feb. 16, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1956594;
Case C-277/10, Luksan v. Petrus van der Let (Feb. 9, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119322&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1957212; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags
GmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I11959; Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-00271.
In the field of trademarks, see: Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion
GmbH v. European Union Intellectual Property Office [EUIPO] (Feb. 27, 2020),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=223843&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2550080; Case C-580/13, Coty
Germany GmbH v. Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165900&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1974194; Case T-587/13, Schwerdt v. OHIM - Iberamigo
(cat&clean) (Jan. 21, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=161548&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
1975061; Case T-106/12, Cytochroma Development, Inc. v. OHIM (July 3, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139072&pageIndex=
12
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In addition, an accession of the E.U. to the ECtHR is envisaged, 13 making
ECtHR case law highly relevant for the E.U. This is important since the
ECtHR has a longer tradition of applying human rights to intellectual
property. 14 As a result, European judges have already started to actively rely
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1975452;
Case
T-542/10,
XXXLutz Marken v. OHIM, (June 13, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=123788&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=1980694; Case T-526/09, PAKI Logistics GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R.
II-00346; Case T-232/10, Couture Tech Ltd. v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-06469.
In the field of patents, see: Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE
Corp. (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1983272;
Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council of the European Union (May 5, 2015), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164093&pageIndex=0&doclang=
en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1984326; Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace
eV, 2011 E.C.R. I-09821; Case C-127/00, Hässle AB v. Ratiopharm GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I14781; Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-07079.
For an overview of CJEU case law touching on the intersection of fundamental
rights and intellectual property, see Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?,
supra note 5; Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual
Property, supra note 5, at 115; Mylly, supra note 5, at 103; Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power

Tools to the Acquis—The Court of Justice, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and European
Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 144 (Christophe
Geiger et al. eds., 2018); Stijan van Deursen & Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the
Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49

INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1080 (2018).
See Treaty on European Union art. 6(2), Feb. 7, 1992 as amended by Treaty of Lisbon art.
1(8), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C306); European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
art. 59(2), Nov. 4, 1950, as amended by Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR.
Although the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of the E.U. accession to the ECHR
(Opinion 2/13 of Dec. 18, 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the accession, which
remains binding on the E.U.
To give only a few examples of the amplitude of the phenomenon, the ECtHR has tested
the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug for its compliance with the Convention’s
property provision in Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87,
44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep 70 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-738. The
court assessed the proportionality of the requirement to pay damages for a short news
broadcast of copyrighted works with regards to a television channel’s right to freely
communicate information in Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App.
No. 30262/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411. And finally, the court considered whether an
unauthorized reproduction of the portrait and name of an ancestor in a brewery’s trademark
was sufficient to cause distress by encroaching on the private and family life in ECtHR,
Vorsina v. Russia (dec.), no. 66801/01, Feb. 5, 2004, CE:ECHR:2004:0205DEC006680101.
The ECtHR has also examined the circumstances under which a non-authorized
posting of the copyright-protected materials online can be shielded by the “infringers’” right
to communicate information (and by the corresponding right of the public to receive it) in
ECtHR,
Donald
v.
France,
no.
36769/08,
Jan.
10.
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French) and ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v.
13

14
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on the case law of the ECtHR when deciding intellectual property cases, 15
and this tendency can only be expected to increase.
This article reflects on these important developments through an
examination of the ECtHR’s role in shaping European intellectual property
standards. Surprisingly, most of the decisions rendered by the ECtHR have
received relatively little comment, with the exception of a handful of cases. 16
Sweden
(The
Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712.
In the procedural context of the right to a fair trial, a violation of a reasoned judicial
decision was established by the ECtHR in the national court’s failure to address the
applicant’s argument relating to her trademark’s priority in ECtHR, Balani v. Spain, no.
18064/91, Dec. 9, 1994, CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491, whereas, the proceedings
decisive for the registration of the applicant’s design that lasted almost four years amounted
to a violation of a reasonable time requirement in view of the total duration of protection of
five years, counted from the date of filing an application in Denev v. Sweden, App. No.
25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00146116.
For a comprehensive overview of the intellectual property decisions of the ECtHR,
see Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European
Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9 (Christophe
Geiger et al. eds., 2018).
See, e.g., Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., Cours d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
July 18, 2001, [2001] EWCA Civ. 1142 (Fr.); Hugo v. Plon SA, Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 30, 2007, Bull. civ. I, No. 04-15.543 (Fr.),
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arret_n_98
50.html; Metall auf Metall, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 31, 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513 (Ger.);
Peter Klasen v. Alix Malka, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e
civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030600576; Bauret v.
Koons, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e
ch., Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15-01086 (Fr.); Brussels Commercial Court, Moët Hennessy
Champagne Servs v. BVBA Cedric Art, Rechtbanken van Koophandel [Kh.] [commerce
tribunal] Brussels, Apr. 12, 2018, No. A/17/02627, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/578b3fa715d5db22cadfadd3/t/5b360b61575d1f7d68e23004/1530268520602/damn+
perignon.pdf.
Those concern, principally, a few cases on the protection of IP under the human right to
property (in particular, ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan.
11, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901) and a number of decisions on the
intersection of copyright protection with freedom of expression (notably, Société Nationale
de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15,
1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411 (available only in French); ECtHR,
Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908
(available only in French); and ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no.
40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712). For comments on some
of those cases, see, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual
Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2008)
[hereinafter Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?]; Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343 (Rochelle Dreyfuss,
15

16
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The lack of attention is partially due to the fact that the court delivers some
of its decisions, including in the sphere of IP, only in French. Despite the
relative lack of doctrinal attention, the ECtHR’s concern regarding the
conformity of IP standards with Europe’s catalogue of human rights and
fundamental freedoms continues to grow. 17 An increased involvement of the
ECtHR in IP regulation has already influenced both national judges 18 and
another supranational European tribunal, the Court of Justice of the E.U.
(CJEU), 19 which calls for closer scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court’s approach
to resolving IP disputes. Indeed, the case law of the Strasbourg Court
provides important guidance on how the conflicts pertaining to the IPhuman rights intersection can be adjudicated by the lower courts.

et al. eds. 2001); Bogdan Dragos, Intellectual Property in the Case-Law of the European
Court of Human Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CKSCERDOCT DOCTORAL SCHOOLS, CHALLENGES OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY,
BUCHAREST 93 (2011); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human
Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 45
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014); Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of
Expression and the Right to Information: Implications for Copyright, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331 (Christophe Geiger
ed., 2015).
See Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property,
supra note 5, at 115; see also Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension
at EU Level, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27 (Estelle
Derclaye ed., 2009).
See, e.g., Metall auf Metall, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 31, 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513 (Ger.);
Klasen v. Malka, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., May
15, 2015, Bull. Civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030600576; HR april 3,
2015, NJ 2015/183, m.nt. BB (GS Media BV/Sanoma Media Netherlands BV) (Neth.),
paras. 5.2.5–5.2.6, https://e-justice.europa.eu/ecli/NL001/nl/ECLI:NL:HR:2015:841.html?
index=0&ascending=false&lang=en; England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division),
Rocknroll v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2013] EWHC (Ch) 24 [42] (Eng.); GHDHA
Amsterdam 4 mei 2011, KG ZA 11-294 2011 389526 (Plesner/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA)
(Neth.), paras. 4.2–4.3.
See, e.g., Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
para. 74 (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
203686; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 58 (July 29, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1951971; Case C-280/15, Nikolajeva
v. Multi Protect OÜ, para. 43 (June 22, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=180686&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&d
ir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2285791; Case T-106/12, Cytochroma Development, Inc. v.
OHIM, para. 46 (July 3, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=139072&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=1975452.
17
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This article provides the first attempt to give a comprehensive
overview of the ECtHR case law on IP. 20 It starts with the right to a property
framework for intellectual property and the protection it affords to the
economic interests of IP holders (Part II). The article then proceeds to the
instances of alleged interference of IP protection with other rights
guaranteed by the Convention. This includes, first and foremost, the right
to freedom of expression and information, frequently invoked by the user
community as a counterweight to certain over-expansionist tendencies in IP
protection (Part III). It will be demonstrated, however, that freedom of
expression can serve as a basis not only for the claims of the so-called
“infringers,” but also for those of the (actual or potential) IP holders
themselves. The most salient examples are freedom of expression claims of
trademark applicants regarding the restrictions on the registration of
trademarks that are considered immoral, offensive, or otherwise against
public order. Part IV, subsequently, focuses on the rarer examples of IP
interaction with the right to privacy and is mainly reduced to questions of
exercising remedies for IP infringement and certain, largely theoretical,
arguments supporting the protection of moral rights under the scope of
privacy rights. Furthermore, the right to non-discrimination—which gave rise
to disputes involving restrictions imposed on some types of business by
national broadcasting and copyright legislation and disputes concerning the
different nature of patent appeal proceedings—merits a separate
examination in Part V. A range of procedural guarantees, such as the right
of access to courts, finality of court decisions, the tribunal’s independence
and impartiality, reasonable duration of proceedings, and many others that
had been considered by the ECtHR in IP proceedings, are analyzed in the
last Part of the article (Part VI). Lastly, this article ends with some
concluding observations.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR THE

Those (not many) doctrinal sources devoted to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on IP matters
often concentrate on a specific Convention right of relevance for IP protection, such as the
right to property, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, or the right to
freedom of expression and information, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16. Other sources, even
when examining several Convention provisions of relevance for IP, do not cover them all,
providing an analysis only from the perspective of IP owners (and not users), see Dragos,
supra note 16; David S. Welkowitz, Privatizing Human Rights? Creating Intellectual
Property Rights from Human Rights Principles, 46 AKRON L. REV. 675 (2013), or
concentrating on the impact of Convention rights on a particular jurisdiction, see Timothy
Pinto, The Influence of the European Convention on Human Rights in Intellectual Property
Rights, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209, 217 (2002).
20
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PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF IP HOLDERS
As mentioned already, in the United States, intellectual property is
subject to the “Progress of Science and Useful Arts” clause of Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution. In this sense, the U.S.
Constitution’s approach to intellectual property is similar to that taken in
the international instruments for human rights protection such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 21 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 22 Notably,
both Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR place
intellectual property protection within the context of the freedom of the arts
and sciences. 23
Neither the Progress of Science and useful Arts clause of the U.S.
Constitution nor Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR
explicitly mention the right to property, arguably making other means of
protection equally conceivable. 24 By contrast, the European system of
human rights protection unequivocally subjects intellectual property to the
property regime. The E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, 25 for instance,
explicitly places intellectual property within the general provision on the

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
For further analysis of these provisions, see, e.g., ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BEYOND 110 (2007); Caterina Sganga, Right to Culture and Copyright:
Participation and Access, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 560; Lea Shaver and Caterina Sganga, The Right
to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637
(2010). Additionally, see the two consecutive reports by Farida Shaheed (the U.N. Special
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights) on intellectual property policies and the right to
science and culture, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014) and U.N. Doc. A/70/279
(Aug. 4, 2015). For an examination of domestic and international approaches to
constitutional protection of intellectual property via its inclusion within, for example, the
general right to property, freedom of the arts and sciences, or even freedom of expression,
see Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights
Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 661.
See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17:
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests
Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the
Author, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006); see also Christophe Geiger,
21
22

23

24

Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and International) Intellectual
Property Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223,

227 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
391–407.
25
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right to property in Article 17 of the Charter. 26 Although the ECHR makes
no mention of IP, the ECtHR and its former Commission of Human
Rights 27 have been gradually attaching different IP rights to the ECHR’s
property provision in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 28 Moreover, not only was
the acquired intellectual property title deemed protected but so were the
applications for its registration. 29 An overview of the Convention case law on
the right to property makes it possible to distinguish three categories of
cases: IP disputes originating from a direct state action (Section II.A); IP
disputes between private parties that can still be attributed to the state by
virtue of the Convention’s horizontal effect (Section II.B); and claims
against international organizations, notably, the European Patent Office
(EPO) (Section II.C). 30

A. Negative Aspect: Direct State Interference with the Exercise of IP
On the IP clause of the E.U. Charter, see Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall
Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009);
Geiger, Intellectual “Property” After the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 11.

26

The European Commission of Human Rights (Eur. Comm’n H.R.) was the ECHR body
abolished in 1998 and had been, until then, entrusted with decisions on the admissibility of
applications to the Strasbourg Court. See Protocol 11 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control
Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, 1994 E.T.S. 155.
In the field of patent law, see: Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No.
12633/87, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-738; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97, 94-B Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 136, 145, para. 2 (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0014408.
In the field of copyright, see: A.D. v. Netherlands, App. No. 21962/93, para. 3
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 11, 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2600; Aral v.
Turkey, App. No. 24563/94, para. 4 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064; ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00,
May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (available only in French); ECtHR,
Melnychuk
v.
Ukraine
(dec.),
no.
28743/03,
July
5,
2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 3; ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03,
Jan. 29, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703, para. 34; ECtHR, SC Editura
Orizonturi
SRL
v.
Romania,
no.
15872/03,
May
13,
2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203 (available only in French), para. 70; ECtHR, SIA
AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016, CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205,
para. 41.
In the field of trademarks, see: ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal [GC],
no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 72; ECtHR,
Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 21770/05, Sept. 18,
2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904, para. 1.
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 78.
For an excellent analysis of the ECHR’s law on the right to property in its application to
intellectual property, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16.
27
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Rights
The first category of property-as-a-basis-for-IP cases is the most
“traditional” insofar as this category pertains to allegations of interference
with the applicants’ intellectual property rights directly attributable to states
(the only parties accountable under the Convention). In the IP context, the
following types of disputes originating in a direct state action were brought
to the attention of Convention organs: non-recognition of (Section II.A.1)
or refusal to restore the applicant’s IP entitlement (Section II.A.2) and a
more specific issue pertaining to compulsory licensing (Section II.A.3).

1. Non-Recognition of an Applicant’s IP Entitlement
The first type of dispute resulting from a direct state action—nonrecognition of the applicant’s IP entitlement under the domestic legal
system—was considered at length for the first time in 2005 in the case of
Dima v. Romania. 31 The applicant in that case was a graphic designer who
had worked in the studio of Plastic Arts of the Romanian Defense Ministry.
After the fall of the communist regime in December 1989, Romanian
authorities decided to adopt a new state emblem, and a public competition
was launched. The design project prepared by the applicant was chosen over
many other submissions, and the applicant was appointed to work with two
other experts in history and heraldry on the model of a new emblem.
Approved by the Romanian Parliament, the design proposed by the
applicant was ratified by the Law on the State Emblem and Seal and
published in the Official Journal of Romania. The applicant’s name
appeared in that journal, bearing the mention “graphic designer.” For an
unspecified reason, the applicant had never, however, been remunerated
for his work.
Seeking to obtain compensation and to assert copyright in his
design, the applicant brought several lawsuits against the companies that had
reproduced and distributed the state emblem and seal—namely, the two
private companies and one state enterprise responsible for the minting of
Romanian coins. The applicant’s claims were, nevertheless, rejected in all
instances on the grounds that copyright in the design subsisted in the
Romanian Parliament who had commissioned the work and that, in any
event, the state emblem and seal could not be subject to copyright. The trial
and appellate courts relied on the new Copyright Law of 1996, which, unlike
the law in force at the time of the design’s creation, explicitly excluded state
symbols from copyrightable subject matter. The applicant appealed to the
ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (available only in French). For an assessment of this
case, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 14–18; Dragos, supra note
16, at 96, 100–01.
31
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Romanian Supreme Court of Justice on points of law, challenging the
retroactive application of the 1996 Law to his situation. The Romanian
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, essentially basing its argument—unlike
the lower courts—on the 1956 Decree on Copyright that was in force at the
time the models were designed by the applicant. It reasoned that, even in
the absence of explicit exclusion of state symbols from copyrightable subject
matter, the 1956 Decree did not provide that the state emblem and seal
could be copyrighted because the Decree used the positive enumeration
technique in defining the scope of protection.
The applicant contested the Romanian Supreme Court’s finding
before the ECtHR. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of
property) to the Convention, he complained that the domestic courts’
interpretation of national copyright laws deprived him of his copyright in
the design of the state emblem and seal and from the income he could have
obtained by exploiting his work as an author. He maintained that his
copyright arose from the moment he created the design or, at the latest,
from the moment he was mentioned as an author in the Official Journal of
Romania. He further asserted that even in the event of a qualifying contract,
this would not prevent the creation of a work and copyright ownership.
The Strasbourg Court first stated that intellectual property was
covered by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and, therefore,
found it appropriate to examine whether the applicant had, in this respect,
“possession” or at least a “legitimate expectation” of acquiring
“possession.” 32 Concerning the latter point, the Strasbourg Court,
nonetheless, abstained from interfering with the domestic courts’ reasoning
and declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible ratione materiae—that
is, due to the applicant’s failure to prove that the right claimed by him was
recognized, at least arguably, under Romanian law. 33 The Strasbourg Court
noted that it was for the national courts to determine the disputes on the
existence or scope of copyright, stressing in particular that at no point in the
domestic proceedings did those courts find in favor of the applicant. 34 Nor
was there any favorable case law allowing the applicant to prove that it was
possible to acquire copyright in the designs of the state emblem and seal. 35
Moreover, the Romanian Supreme Court’s interpretation of national
copyright laws excluded that possibility. It, therefore, followed that the
applicant did not have “possession” or at least a “legitimate expectation” of
acquiring “possession” in terms of the Convention. 36 In particular, no
ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526
DEC005847200 (available only in French).
32

33
34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“legitimate expectation” could be said to arise where there was a dispute as
to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law, and the
applicant’s submissions were subsequently rejected by the national courts. 37
In this light, with regard to the limited power of the Strasbourg Court to
review alleged errors of fact or law committed by the national courts, the
court found that Romanian Supreme Court’s decision in the applicant’s case
did not appear arbitrary. 38
However, in a similar dispute three years later, the Strasbourg Court
reached an opposite conclusion. The case at issue, Bălan v. Moldova, 39
concerned the refusal of Moldovan courts to compensate the applicant for
unauthorized use of a photograph by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a
background for national identity cards. Unlike Dima, in Bălan, the
applicant’s authorship was acknowledged by the domestic courts that also
awarded him some compensation. 40 Yet, the applicant’s request for a
contract for future use of the photograph and the claim for compensation
for the continued unlawful use of it were, after a series of court decisions,
rejected by the country’s supreme court. 41 The Moldovan Supreme Court
reasoned that the applicant had failed to request the prohibition of any
further use and that identity cards, as official documents, could not be
subject to copyright. 42
The Strasbourg Court, to which the case was referred thereafter,
found that the refusal of the domestic courts to award the applicant
compensation following the breach of his copyright amounted to a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. 43 First, the Strasbourg Court
took note of the fact that the applicant’s rights in the photograph had been
recognized by the domestic courts in a final judgment and, therefore,
constituted a “possession” within the meaning of the ECHR’s property
provision. 44 As to the supreme court’s argument that identity cards could not
be subject to copyright, the Strasbourg Court pointed to the distinction in
the relevant national law between the authors’ rights with respect to their
works and the property rights over the material object in which their creation
37
38

Id.
Id.

ECtHR,
Bălan
v.
Moldova,
no.
19247/03,
Jan.
29,
2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703. For a discussion of this case, see HELFER & AUSTIN,
supra note 5, at 212–13; Dragos, supra note 16, at 105; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,
39

Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights Law: Approaches of European Courts to
Address Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 70, 80–82, 87.
40
41
42
43
44

ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03, para. 48.

Id. paras. 15–16.
Id. para. 17.
Id. para. 46.
Id. paras. 34–36.
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was embodied. 45 Since the Moldovan Supreme Court only referred to
identity cards, and not to the photograph taken by the applicant, its finding
that identity cards could not be subject to copyright had no bearing on the
applicant’s copyright as applied to his photograph. 46
Insofar as it concerned the applicant’s failure to ask the courts to
prohibit the use of his work, the Strasbourg Court believed that the
impugned use of the photograph, even in the absence of the applicant’s
petition, posed an interference with his right. 47 This was because the illegal
character of the unauthorized use was not conditioned in law by any
particular act of the copyright owner, “such as the request for a court
injunction against such use.” 48 Finally, on the subject of proportionality, the
Court concluded that the applicant’s interest in the protection of his
copyright outweighed the community interest in issuing identity cards, as the
latter aim could have been reached in a variety of ways not involving the
breach of the applicant’s IP rights. 49
An additional case concerning the non-recognition of an applicant’s
IP entitlement has recently come up before the Strasbourg Court; this time
in the context of trademark protection. The case of Kamoy Radyo
Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, decided in April
2019, 50 concerned a Turkish media company. In 1999, a company affiliated
with the applicant began publishing a newspaper, Özlenen Gazete Vatan,
after having registered the name as a trademark. 51 However, soon after, it
closed for financial reasons. In 2002, another company, Bağımsız
Gazetecilik Yayıncılık A.Ş., began publishing a newspaper called Vatan,
which is what prompted the affiliated company to initiate the trademark
infringement proceedings. The trademark was later transferred to the
applicant company and thus it became a party to the proceedings. 52
The first-instance court rejected the applicant’s trademark
protection claim, arguing that the newspaper Vatan had been published
since 1975 and had become well-known prior to the applicant company’s
application for its registration as a trademark. 53 The court further relied on
45
46
47
48
49

Id. para. 35.
Id.
Id. paras. 38–40.
Id. para. 38.
Id. para. 45. Note that a similar type of claim on the alleged violation by public authorities

of the applicant’s copyright on the design drawings for the National Bank’s commemorative
coins is currently pending before the Strasbourg Court. ECtHR, AsDAC v. Republic of
Moldova, no. 47384/07, communicated on Jan. 17, 2013.
ECtHR, Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, no.
19965/06, Apr. 16, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0416JUD001996506.
Id. paras. 5–6.
Id. paras. 9–10.
Id. para. 12.

50
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52
53
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section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, which came into force
during the proceedings in November 2003. 54 According to that law,
publishers of periodicals could not be prevented from publishing on the
basis of trademark protection. The judgment was upheld on appeal. 55
Separately, the Turkish Constitutional Court, in 2008, annulled section
31(2) of the Patent Institute Act, finding that it did not conform to the
property rights guaranteed by the Turkish Constitution. 56
Before the Strasbourg Court, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(protection of property), the applicant company complained of an unlawful
restriction on the use of its trademark because of the retroactive application
of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, which had protected the
other party in the dispute. 57 The Strasbourg Court held that the applicant
company had had possession within the meaning of the Convention and not
just a legitimate expectation of obtaining a property right. 58 There had also
been an interference with that possession due to the application of section
31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act. 59 In addition, the subsequent
annulment of this provision by the Turkish Constitutional Court rendered
the protection of trademarks meaningless, was not in the public interest, and
violated the applicant’s right to property. 60 The Turkish government failed
to make any arguments supporting the existence of a legitimate aim for the
piece of legislation in question. 61 Nor could it put forward any justification
on general interest grounds for the way the legal dispute between the
companies had been settled by the retroactive application of the law. 62
Accordingly, the government could not prove that the interference with the
applicant company’s property rights had served a public interest. As a result,
there was a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property)
to the Convention. 63

2. Refusal to Restore an IP Title
The state’s refusal to restore a previously recognized IP title, as a
second instance of direct state action, was at stake in the case of University
of Illinois Foundation v. Netherlands. 64
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id. paras. 13–15.
Id. para. 17.
Id. para. 13.
Id. paras. 37–38.
Id. para. 42.
Id. para. 48.
Id. para. 50.
Id.
Id. paras. 51–52.

Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2,
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}.
64

544

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

The case concerned the lapse of a patent granted by the Dutch Patent
Council as a result of the applicant’s failure to pay a patent maintenance fee
on time. The Dutch representative had failed to notify the applicant, an
American corporate body, that the annual fee had not been paid due to a
technical error and to remind them to pay it within a six-month period after
the deadline. By the time the applicant discovered the oversight, the patent
had already lapsed. The Dutch Patent Council rejected the applicant’s
request for restoration of the patent due to a provision in the Dutch Patent
Act, which prevented applicants from requesting restoration when the loss
of rights resulted from late payments and an extended payment period
existed.
Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of
the ECHR, the applicant complained that it had been deprived of its
possessions and that the public interest involved in the lapse of its patent
was not proportionate to the applicant’s interest. This assertion was,
however, rejected by the European Commission of Human Rights. It
reasoned that the right to have the patent restored had no legal basis in either
Dutch patent law or in the ECHR itself. 65 Accordingly, its recognition
“would essentially entail a right to acquire property, 66 which [was] not
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.” 67 The ruling of the Commission
might seem quite radical. Nevertheless, it is rather old (rendered in 1988),
and the position of the court might be different today if a similar case were
brought before it. As the ECtHR has made clear on numerous occasions,
the ECHR is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions.” 68 A recent example from Belgium is instructive in
this regard. In 2014, the Belgian Constitutional Court found that revoking a
patent due to a failure to provide a translation within the strict three-month
deadline and without the possibility of restoration was a disproportionate
deprivation of property in view of the legislators’ aim to inform the public
on the scope of the patent and a non-justified damage to the right to property
of the patent holder. 69 Such a sanction was, accordingly, held to be contrary
to the Belgian Constitution’s property provision (Article 16) when read in
conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.
65
66
67

Id. para. 1.
Id.
Id.

ECtHR, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, July 28, 1999,
CE:ECHR:1999:0728JUD002580394, para. 101; see also ECtHR, Matthews v. United
Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, Feb. 18, 1999, CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002483394, para.
39; ECtHR, Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], no. 14939/03, Feb. 10, 2009,
CE:ECHR:2009:0210JUD001493903, para. 80.
BioPheresis Techs. Inc. v. Belgium, Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court],
No. 3/2014 (Jan. 16, 2014) (Belg.) (available in French), https://www.const-court.be/public/
f/2014/2014-003f.pdf.
68

69
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3. Compulsory Licensing
A different category of disputes involving direct state action
revolved around the grant of compulsory licenses for the use of protected
works. The question of whether such a grant amounts to an unjustified
interference with the rightsholder’s possessions was raised before
Convention institutions twice.
The first case, Smith Kline v. Netherlands, 70 dates back to 1990. It
concerned a grant of a compulsory license by the Dutch Patent Office for
the applicant company’s (the dominant patent holder) patented drug to the
owner of a dependent patent after the former refused to grant such a license.
Although the Commission found that the decisions of the Dutch
Patent Office conferring a compulsory license for the applicant’s patent
constituted a control of the use of property, 71 the Commission nevertheless
considered that such control was lawful and pursued the legitimate aim of
encouraging technological and economic development. 72 As for
proportionality, the Commission observed that:
[T]he provision only comes into effect where such licence is
necessary for the working of a patent of the same or later date and
the licence should be limited to what is required for the working
of the patent. Further, the owner of the dominant patent is
entitled to royalties in respect of each compulsory licence granted
under the legislation and receives reciprocal rights under the
dependent patent. While the Commission recalls that the Patent
Office is not required to investigate in each particular case
whether the grant of the compulsory licence is necessary in the
general interest, the Commission finds that the framework
imposed by the legislation is intended to prevent abuse of
monopoly situations and encourage development and that this
method of pursuing that aim falls within the margin of
appreciation accorded to the Contracting State. The Commission
accordingly finds that the control of use in the circumstances of
this case did not fail to strike a fair balance between the interests
of the applicant company and the general interest and is in
accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
. . . to the Convention. 73
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70 (1990), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12633/87"],
"itemid":["001-738"]}. For a discussion of this case, see Helfer, The New Innovation
Frontier?, supra note 16, at 12–13, 27–28, 32–35; Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, at 12.
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd., App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
at 70.
70
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Id.
Id.
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The second occasion on which compulsory licensing was tested for
its compliance with the Convention’s property provision arose very
recently—in July 2016—and concerned the Latvian collective rights
management organization (SIA AKKA/LAA). The SIA AKKA/LAA filed
a complaint 74 because it was ordered by national courts to conclude licensing
agreements for the use of musical works of the authors it represented with
two domestic broadcasters. 75 According to the applicant organization, the
national courts’ orders amounted to an unjustified restriction on the
exclusive rights of the authors represented by SIA AKKA/LAA, which
violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the ECHR. 76
The ECtHR disagreed, holding that there had been no violation of
the named provision. 77 It first rejected the Latvian Government’s contention
that the applicant organization could not claim to be a victim of a measure
that infringed the rights guaranteed by the ECHR to its members. 78
According to the court, once the domestic legal order attributed the
protection of the authors’ rights to an organization founded by the authors
for this purpose and vested the organization with independent rights
transferred from the authors, that organization must be regarded as a victim
of a measure affecting these rights. 79 Next, the ECtHR established that SIA
AKKA/LAA was disposed of its “possessions”—that is, the rights transferred
to it by its members 80—and that those possessions had been interfered with
by the domestic courts. 81
ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205. For more on this case, see PRESS UNIT OF THE
ECTHR, FACTSHEET—NEW TECHNOLOGIES 19 (Feb. 2020), http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/FS_New_technologies_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W3V-8EN3].
ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205, para. 38. When concluding that it was within their
competence to set the royalty rate, the national courts relied on Article 11bis of the Berne
Convention (setting out provisions on broadcasting and related rights), section 5 of the
Latvian Civil Procedures Law of October 14, 1998 (providing that a judge must be guided
by the general principles of law and justice when a court is called upon to adjudicate on its
own discretion or when exceptional circumstances have to be taken into account), and
section 41 of the Latvian Copyright Law of April 6, 2000 (Autortiesību likums) (part three
of this section providing that if the license agreement does not set out the royalty rate, the
latter shall be decided by the domestic courts). Id. para. 64. Latvian Civil Procedures and
Copyright Laws are available, with English translation by the World Intellectual Property
Organization
(WIPO),
at:
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=LV
[https://perma.cc/5FPV-67GW].
ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205, para. 38.
Id. para. 81.
Id. paras. 43, 46, 50.
Id. para. 49.
Id. para. 55.
Id. para. 59.
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As to the lawfulness of such interference, the court was satisfied that
the domestic courts’ competence to deal with the issue had some basis in
domestic and international copyright law. 82 The court also found that the
measures at issue pursued a legitimate aim, as they served both the radio
stations’ interest in obtaining a license to legally broadcast the musical works
in question and the public interest in having access to those works. 83 In
reaching this conclusion, the court took into account that “over an extended
period of time protected works were being broadcast without a valid licence,
and that this situation was to a certain extent due to the applicant
organisation’s limited efficiency in carrying out negotiations with the
defendants.” 84
Finally, on the question of proportionality, the court considered
whether the national courts had struck a fair balance between a legitimate
aim and the rights of the collective society to equitable remuneration. In this
regard, the court first noted that, in setting the royalty rate, the domestic
courts relied on the terms already negotiated by the parties who had some
time to reach an agreement. 85 Second, it noted that banning the broadcast
would not have suited the interests of copyright holders seeking to obtain
maximum profit from the exploitation of musical works. 86 The third and
final consideration for the ECtHR was the fact that the domestic courts’
orders for the parties to enter into a licensing agreement were limited in
scope and time. 87
***
This overview of Convention cases pertaining to direct state
interference in the exercise of IP rights demonstrates that the ECtHR leaves
Member States considerable discretion in regulating intellectual property
disputes. 88 Unless IP rights are given domestic recognition in the form of a
legislative act or a court decision, the ECtHR will be reluctant to accept that
the claimed right falls within the Convention’s property provision. In other
words, the court will hesitate to find that any substantive interest protected
by the Convention is conferred on the applicant. In such cases, the IP claim
brought under Article 1 of the First Protocol is likely to be rejected ratione

Id. paras. 64–66.
Id. paras. 69–71.
Id. para. 70.
Id. para. 77.
Id. para. 78.
Id. para. 79.
See Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 132.
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
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materiae. This, as has been shown, was the case in Dima v. Romania and
University of Illinois Foundation.
89

90

Even if the claimed interest has a substantive basis, and an
interference with the applicant’s IP right can be established, a wide margin
of appreciation is left to Member States to decide how they will balance their
interest in protecting IP with other interests of general importance for
society. This would include encouraging technological and economic
development or wider access to musical works, as was the case, respectively,
in Smith Kline and SIA AKKA/LAA.
It is important to bear in mind that the Convention’s property
protection is far from absolute 91 and that the Strasbourg Court rarely
interferes with the findings of the national courts. Only in situations of
blatant violations or retroactive applications of law, such as those in Bălan
v. Moldova 92 and Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş.
v. Turkey 93 respectively, might the court hold Article 1 of the First Protocol
infringed. For those claims to succeed, however, it is important that the
applicants clearly substantiate their property claims (as they have the burden
of proof) and that the recognition of their rights can be at least somewhat
traced to the national level.

B. Positive Aspect: State Failure to Regulate IP Disputes Between Private
Parties
Although the Strasbourg Court may not, as a general rule, receive
applications against private parties, “the obligation to secure the effective
exercise of Convention rights may involve positive obligations of a State, and
. . . these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.” 94 This extension
of the Convention’s reach to disputes between private actors (also known as

ECtHR,
Dima
v.
Romania,
no.
58472/00,
Nov.
16,
2006,
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200.
Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2,
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}.
See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics
Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 153–76 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013); Geiger, supra note
23.
ECtHR,
Bălan
v.
Moldova,
no.
19247/03,
Jan.
29,
2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703.
ECtHR, Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, no.
19965/06, Apr. 16, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0416JUD001996506.
J.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19173/91 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 8, 1993),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1477.
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a “horizontal effect” of the Convention 95) may take place, for example, when
the national legislation does not meet the requirements of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention or when the losses of one of the parties
to the (essentially private) proceedings are caused by arbitrary
determinations of the state’s judicial bodies. In both types of cases, the
national judicial decisions are regarded as a form of state action. 96
In relation to intellectual property proceedings, the Strasbourg
Court and its former Commission had to consider allegations of Article 1
Protocol No. 1 violations in three categories of cases originating in privateparty litigation: contractual disputes (Section II.B.1), infringement disputes
and claims for royalties (Section II.B.2), and disputes over ownership of an
IP title (Section II.B.3).

1. Contractual Disputes
A contractual intellectual property dispute—the first in the privateparty type of conflict—was the subject of the case of Aral v. Turkey. 97 The
case concerned a copyright infringement suit over artistic material created
by the applicants for certain magazines. The trial court decided that all
financial rights over the artistic material created by the applicants during
their contract with the initial owner of the magazines belonged to the
entrepreneur who subsequently purchased those magazines (H.E.A.), and,
as a result, those materials could not be published without H.E.A.’s
permission. The decision was based on the applicants’ contract with
H.E.A.’s predecessor and on the relevant provisions of the Turkish Law on
Intellectual and Artistic Works, 98 which, at the material time, recognized a
certain form of the work for hire doctrine. In particular, article 8, paragraph
2 of that Law provided that “[u]nless otherwise understood by special
contract between them or the content of the work, the owner of the financial
rights of the works created by the officials, servants and workers in conduct
of their job is the person employing or assigning them.” 99 Nevertheless, the
See JEAN-FRANCOIS AKANDJI-KOMBE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS, NO. 7, at 14–15 (2007),
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff4d [https://perma.cc/B79B-FZVF].
See Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 28.
Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064. For commentary on this case, see Helfer, The
New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 28–29; Dragos, supra note 16, at 97–98.
Turkish Law No. 5846 of 5 December 1951 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (last
amended by Law No. 4110 of 7 June 1995) (English translation from Turkish by the WIPO),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129904 [https://perma.cc/96L3-WASD].
Id. Note that the current version of this law no longer contains this provision. See Law No.
5846 of 5 December 1951 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (amended up to Law No. 6552
of 10 September 2014) (English translation by the WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=440050 [https://perma.cc/9WRK-47P7].
95
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97

98

99

550

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

trial court allowed the applicants to continue using their characters in other
magazines and newspapers but limited such use to other subjects and
stories. The applicants’ subsequent attempts to overturn this decision were
unsuccessful.
In response to the applicants’ challenge of the domestic courts’
refusal to recognize the applicants’ ownership in the artistic material, the
European Commission of Human Rights observed that:
[T]here is no interference with the right to peaceful
enjoyment of possessions when, pursuant to the domestic
law and a contract regulating the relationship between the
parties, a judge orders one party to that contract to
surrender a possession to another, unless it arbitrarily and
unjustly deprives that person of property in favour of
another . . . . 100
Turning to the circumstances of the case before it, the Commission noted
that:
[T]he domestic courts interpreted the domestic law in the light of
the contract between the applicants and H.E.A. They decided
that the owner of the artistic materials, in particular, the pictures,
cartoons, films etc., which were published or which were
unpublished but held in the archives of the magazines ‘Girgir’ and
‘Firt’, was H.E.A. Furthermore, the courts decided that the
applicants could continue to draw the same characters which they
had drawn and published in the two magazines during the period
of their contract, but in association with other subjects and stories,
in other magazines or newspapers. 101
On this basis, the Commission found “no element in the case which
would allow it to conclude that the courts acted in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner.” 102 Accordingly, the Commission did not establish
any shortcomings attributable to the State in this respect. 103
Just a few months later, the Commission again had to resolve a
contractual dispute. This time, the dispute involved a civil claim brought by
applicants who owned legally protected industrial property and construction
secrets in Germany. The applicants sought damages from an Italian
company to which they licensed their trade secrets. The applicants alleged
a breached licensing contract and unauthorized use of transferred
knowledge. 104 The domestic courts dismissed the claim on the grounds of
Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94, para. 4 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064.
100

101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Id. (holding that the complaint must be rejected because it was “manifestly ill-founded”).

G.D. & M. v. Germany, App. No. 29818/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 20, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4256.
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intentional deception, finding that the applicants had been aware of the
impossibility of obtaining legal protection of the technology at stake in Italy.
The applicants appealed the dismissal to the ECtHR, claiming that the
domestic courts’ decisions amounted to a breach of their property rights,
arguing that trade secrets of a high commercial value had been transferred
to the defendant.
The Commission found that, in the course of the domestic judicial
proceedings, the applicants failed to prove that their license had any
commercial value. 105 Accordingly, and insofar as their property claim had
never been recognized by the domestic courts, the impugned decisions of
the German courts “could not have the effect of depriving [the applicants]
of a possession which they owned.” 106 Consequently, “the applicants ha[d]
not shown that they ha[d] the right referred to,” and their complaint under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 107
Despite the brevity of the Commission’s analysis in the above cases,
they nevertheless demonstrate the capability of the Convention organs to
horizontally extend (even if cautiously) the scope of human-rights review to
private-party disputes pertaining to contractual transfer of IP ownership.
Occasionally, however, the Strasbourg Court has rejected
applications that alleged a violation of the Convention’s property provision
without directly involving state actors. For example, it refused to examine
the merits of an Article 1 Protocol No. 1 claim concerning non-enforcement
of a judgment that obliged a private company that was previously owned by
the state to pay royalties to a patent holder. 108 According to the court, since
the debtor enterprise was a private company, the state was absolved of
responsibility for its acts:
The Court has no jurisdiction to consider applications directed
against private individuals or businesses . . . . [I]n this particular
case the judgment against the enterprise could not be enforced
due to the enterprise’s lack of funds and its subsequent
bankruptcy. However, the State is not answerable under the
Convention for that. 109

2. Infringement Disputes and Claims for Royalties
In the second type of property dispute between private parties—
those pertaining to infringement claims and claims for royalties—the
105
106
107

Id. para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
Id.

ECtHR, Mihăilescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 47748/99,
CE:ECHR:2003:0826DEC004774899.
Id. (rejecting the complaint as “manifestly ill-founded”).
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Strasbourg Court was similarly cautious to intervene in domestic courts’
interpretation of intellectual property issues. One example is the case of
Melnychuk v. Ukraine. 110 In that case, the applicant complained about the
refusal of the local newspaper, which published critical reviews of his book,
to also publish the applicant’s reply to that criticism. Arguing that the
newspaper’s refusal raised an issue under Article 10 (freedom of expression)
of the ECHR, Mr. Melnychuk also maintained that the critical reviews
infringed his copyright. However, he did not advance any possible basis for
this claim, and, consequently, the national courts dismissed the claim as
“unsubstantiated.” The applicant appealed to the ECtHR—relying, in
addition to Article 10, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR—but,
once again, without explaining in what way the ECHR’s property provision
was breached.
The ECtHR declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible as
manifestly ill-founded. 111 Having reiterated that intellectual property is
protected in principle by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the court, nevertheless,
noted that the mere “fact that the State, through its judicial system, provided
a forum for the determination of the applicant’s rights and obligations does
not automatically engage its responsibility under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.” 112 Referring to the applicant’s failure to substantiate his copyright
infringement claim, the ECtHR observed that “the national courts
proceeded in accordance with domestic law, giving full reasons for their
decisions” to dismiss the applicant’s complaint. 113 “Thus, their assessment
was not flawed by arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness contrary to
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.” 114
Unlike Melnychuk, an interference with the Convention’s property
provision was established two years later in a dispute over the registration of
domain names that allegedly violated the trademark rights of others. 115 In
that case, the applicant company, Paeffgen Gmbh, was engaged in ecommerce and held several thousand internet domain names registered by
the competent authority. According to the terms of the domain contracts
with the registration authority, it was up to the domain holder to verify
whether the registration and use of the domains infringed the rights of
others. Subsequently, other companies and private individuals brought
ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303. For a discussion of this case, see Helfer, The New
Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 29–30.
ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 3.
110
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Id.
Id.
Id.

ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05,
21770/05, Sept. 18, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904. For more on this case, see
Dragos, supra note 16, at 105.
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several sets of proceedings against the applicant, claiming that Paeffgen’s
registration and use of certain domains breached their trademark rights
and/or their rights to a business name.
In all of those cases, the domestic courts found that the applicant
company had unfairly taken advantage of the plaintiffs’ well-known
denominations. As a result, the applicant was ordered to refrain from using
or disposing of the domains in question and apply for their cancellation—a
decision that Paeffgen further contested before the ECtHR. Paeffgen argued
that the absolute prohibition on using the domain names and the duty to
apply for their cancellation, instead of a duty to merely refrain from a
specific infringement of the plaintiffs’ rights, disproportionately interfered
with Paeffgen’s right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
ECHR.
The Strasbourg Court agreed that the measure in question
amounted to an interference with Paeffgen’s “possessions,” thereby
recognizing that domain names benefit from the protection of Article 1 of
Protocol 1 to the ECHR. 116 It observed, however, that such interference
served to protect the trademark rights or other rights of third parties by
effectively preventing unauthorized use to the detriment of the
rightsholders. 117 Although the domestic courts did not consider less
restrictive measures to be sufficient, the Strasbourg Court found that the
applicant company failed to demonstrate limited ways of using the domains
in question without risking interference with the rights of others. 118 The court
observed that the applicant was aware that the domain name registration did
not imply freedom from third-party claims. 119 It also noted that, at the time
of the domestic court proceedings, the applicant company had hardly used
its domains. 120 Thus, it followed that the domestic judicial orders were
proportionate and had not excessively burdened the applicant. 121
Like the other types of disputes discussed above, the Strasbourg
Court is likely to reject an applicant’s property claim originating from royalty
claims if, at no point in domestic proceedings, domestic courts recognized
that claim. It is on these grounds that the Strasbourg Court declined, for
example, an action concerning a claim for royalties—which domestic courts
had failed to decide for more than twelve years—from a limited liability

ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05,
21770/05, Sept. 18, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904, para. 1.
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company for a furniture line the company had designed. 122 In response to
the applicant’s allegation that he was unable to use his property—the royalties
due by the defendant—as a result of the domestic courts’ failure to decide
on his action, the ECtHR found that the claims, not determined by a final
court decision, did not amount to “possessions” attracting the guarantees of
the Convention’s property provision. 123 Accordingly, just as in the case of
Dima discussed above, the complaint was declared inadmissible ratione
materiae. 124
As can be seen, ECHR rulings concerning disputes in the sphere of
IP infringement and claims for royalties have not provided adequate
opportunities to determine how these types of cases can be approached
from an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 perspective. Such analysis can, however,
be expected soon in the pending case of Safarov v. Azerbaijan. The case
concerns an unauthorized reproduction of the applicant’s book by a youth
non-governmental organization (NGO) on the website of the NGO’s project
on the history of Azerbaijan. 125 When the applicant was informed of the
infringement and requested the removal of his book from the website
(which was done immediately), the book had already been downloaded 417
times. The applicant brought a civil claim against the NGO, asking for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to compensate the loss he incurred
as a result of the unauthorized reproduction of his book.
The trial court dismissed the applicant’s claims by referring to
Article 18 of the Azerbaijani Copyright Law, 126 which permits the
reproduction of copyrighted materials by libraries, archives, and educational
institutions. The court further noted that the book had been removed from
the website upon the applicant’s demand, and the applicant failed to prove
that he had suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage. The applicant
lodged an appeal against this decision, arguing that the trial court had failed
to refer to any of the purposes exhaustively listed in Article 18 of the
Azerbaijani Copyright Law.
The appellate court rejected the applicant’s claim, repeating the
reasoning of the first-instance court. The applicant’s appeal to the
Azerbaijani Supreme Court was likewise dismissed. The supreme court
reiterated the lower instances’ reasoning and additionally referenced Article
15(3) of the Copyright Law, which states that once the lawfully published
ECtHR,
Rapos
v.
Slovakia,
CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302.
Id. para. 40.
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ECtHR, Safarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 885/12, communicated on May 18, 2017.
Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Copyright and Related Rights of 5 June 1996
(amended up to Law No. 636-IVQD of 30 April 2013) (English translation by the WIPO),
https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/az/az102en.pdf [https://perma.cc/926ZJU8W].
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copies of a book are sold, those copies can be further distributed without
the author’s consent and without paying royalty to the author.
The applicant then complained to the ECtHR, raising claims about
the domestic court’s reasoning of their decisions under Article 6(1) (fair
trial) of the ECHR and about the state’s failure to protect his copyright, in
alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to
the ECHR. In May 2017, both claims were communicated to the
Azerbaijani Government, which is an indication that the case is likely to be
examined on the merits, instead of being rejected at the point of
admissibility review.

3. Disputes over Ownership of An IP Title
The final type of the private-party disputes originated in claims of
competing ownership of an intellectual property right. Without a doubt, the
most prominent example is the case of Anheuser-Busch, which, to date, is
also the sole intellectual property dispute that has made it to the ECtHR’s
highest body, the Grand Chamber. 127
The applicant, an American company selling beer in the United
States under the brand name “Budweiser,” decided to enter European
markets and sell beer under the same trademark. In 1981, it applied for a
trademark registration for “Budweiser” in Portugal. 128 A Czech company,
Budějovický Budvar, which also produced beer under the name
“Budweiser,” opposed the application. 129 It argued that “Budweiser Bier”
had already been registered in its name as an appellation of origin under the
1958 Lisbon Agreement. 130 Following the breakdown of negotiations that
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. For a discussion of this case, see Klaus Dieter Beiter,
The Right to Property and the Protection of Interests in Intellectual Property—A Human
127

Rights Perspective on the European Court of Human Rights’ Decision in Anheuser-Bush
Inc. v. Portugal, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 714 (2008); Burkhart
Goebel, Trade Marks are “Possessions,” as are Applications, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC.
197 (2007); Jennifer W. Reiss, Commercializing Human Rights: Trademarks in Europe
After Anheuser-Bush v. Portugal, 14 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 176 (2011); Dragos, supra
note 16, at 101–02, 106; Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 3–4, 12–
13, 18–28, 30–32; Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ENHANCED EDITION OF COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
335, 346–47 (Paul L. C. Torremans ed., 2008); Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 701–07.
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 16.
The term “Budweiser” came from Budweis, a German name for the town of České
Budějovice in Bohemia, in the Czech Republic, where Budějovický Budvar produced its
beer.
The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their
International Registration was signed in Lisbon on October 31, 1958, revised in Stockholm
on July 14, 1967, and amended on September 28, 1979. The Lisbon Agreement enables
128

129

130
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took place throughout the 1980s between the two companies, they moved
to the courts. In 1995, the applicant company succeeded in claiming that
the product to which the Czech company’s registration referred was not an
appellation of origin, and that its registration should, accordingly, be
cancelled. 131 The applicant then obtained a registration certificate for the
“Budweiser” trademark. 132
Budějovický Budvar appealed the issuance of the certificate,
invoking a 1986 Bilateral Agreement between Portugal and Czechoslovakia
on the reciprocal protection of appellations of origin. 133 The trial court
dismissed the appeal, finding that the only intellectual property eligible for
protection under Portuguese law and the Bilateral Agreement was the
“Českobudějovický Budvar” appellation of origin, and not the German
translation of this phrase into “Budweiser Bier.” 134
This decision was, however, overturned by the appellate court in a
judgment subsequently affirmed by the Portuguese Supreme Court, which
held that the protection under the 1986 Agreement between the two states
extended to cover translations of names of their respective national
products. The applicant company’s registration of “Budweiser” as a
trademark was, therefore, refused. 135 In a last bid to defend its interests, the
American company appealed to the ECtHR, claiming that the Portuguese
Supreme Court’s application of a bilateral treaty that came into force after
it had filed its application to register the trademark and ultimately caused
the application’s rejection, disproportionately interfered with its right to the
protection of intellectual property, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the ECHR.
The case was first considered by the Strasbourg Court’s Chamber,
which, in a judgment of October 11, 2005, held that there had been no
violation of the applicant company’s (intellectual) property rights. 136 This was
because the company had failed to obtain a final registration of its trademark
Contracting States to request other Contracting States to protect appellations of origin of
certain products, if the appellations were recognized and protected as such in the country of
origin and registered at the International Bureau of the WIPO. Both Portugal and the Czech
Republic, as a successor to Czechoslovakia, were parties to this Agreement.
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 18.
Id. para. 19.
This was the agreement between the governments of the Portuguese Republic and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, on the Protection of Indications of Source, Appellations of
Origin, and Other Geographical and Similar Designations, which was signed in Lisbon on
January 10, 1986 and came into force on March 7, 1987, after publication in the Official
Gazette.
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 21.
Id. para. 24.
Id. para. 53.
131

132
133

134

135
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(and not the application for the registration of a trademark), which could
only be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of the ECHR. 137 The
Chamber clarified that the applicant company had had a hope for—but not
a legally protected legitimate expectation of—acquiring such a
“possession.” 138 Accordingly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was held to be
inapplicable to the mere applications for trademark registration. 139
Upon the applicant company’s request, the case was then referred
to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber considered the bundle of
financial rights and interests that derived from an application for trademark
registration, which, notwithstanding its conditional character, provided a
substantial financial value for the applicant company. 140 The Grand
Chamber, thus, noted that the applicant owned a set of proprietary rights
recognized by domestic law in connection with its trademark application,
which was to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 141
Nonetheless, no violation of that provision was recognized by the
Grand Chamber. 142 As to the issue of the alleged retrospective application
of the 1986 Agreement, it noted that the applicant company did not have
an effective registration in existence when the impugned legislation took
effect. 143 Concerning the applicant company’s allegation of violation of the
right of priority of its trademark application, the ECtHR reiterated that its
role was not to review domestic courts’ interpretation of relevant
legislation. 144 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Portuguese Supreme
Court’s judgment did not interfere with the applicant company’s right to the
peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. 145
***
One important conclusion arising from an overview of Convention
cases on IP disputes between private parties is that many essentially private
disputes can still be attributed to the state. An exception is the case of
Mihăilescu v. Romania 146 discussed above. However, for the horizontal
effect of the Convention to come into play, courts hearing such disputes
must do more than “provide[] a forum for the determination of the
applicant’s rights.” 147 There must also be a reasonable suspicion of
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. paras. 50–52.
Id. para. 52.
Id. para. 53.
Id. para. 76.
Id. para. 78.
Id. para. 87.
Id. para. 84.
Id. para. 85.
Id. para. 87.

146

ECtHR, Mihăilescu v. Romania (dec.) no. 47748/99, Aug. 26,
CE:ECHR:2003:0826DEC004774899.
ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5,
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 3.

2003,

147

2005,
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arbitrariness or unfairness on the part of the domestic judiciary or a lack of
proportionality in the domestic judiciary’s approach towards balancing the
applicant’s interests. If the domestic courts interpret national law in a
manner that is inconsistent with the Convention’s requirements—including,
by application of legislation which contradicts the guarantees of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1—the horizontal effect of the ECHR arises. This is a positive
phenomenon, as it extends the safeguards of human rights review to the
private-party level.
In general, the principles on which the Strasbourg Court decides
private IP disputes are hardly different from those that have already been
outlined above in relation to claims originating from a direct state action.
The claimed IP entitlement must find some recognition at the national level
for the issue to arise under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. Once
such recognition is established, the questions of whether there was an
interference with the applicant’s possessions and whether it was in
accordance with law, served a legitimate aim, and was proportionate to that
aim will be left to the wide discretion of the Member States to the ECHR.
As discussed above, the first criterion (recognition of the property
right by the domestic legal system) was not met in Rapos v. Slovakia, where
the claims in a design dispute that was not determined by a final court
decision could not qualify as a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. 148 In cases where the applicants’ property
claim fell within the scope of Article 1 of the First Protocol, no violation was
recognized either due to the applicants’ failure to properly substantiate their
claims (G.D. & M. v. Germany 149 and Melnychuk v. Ukraine 150) or due to
the wide discretion accorded to domestic courts in balancing the applicants’
intellectual property rights with other competing interests (Aral, 151 Paeffgen
Gmbh, 152 and Anheuser-Busch 153). Notably, most such cases were rejected as
manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, were not even adjudicated on the
merits. 154
ECtHR,
Rapos
v.
Slovakia,
no.
25763/02,
May
20,
2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302, para. 40.
G.D. & M. v. Germany, App. No. 29818/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 20, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4256.
ECtHR,
Melnychuk
v.
Ukraine,
no.
28743/03,
July
5,
2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 1.
Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064.
ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05,
21770/05, Sept. 18, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904, para. 1.
ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901.
Of all the cases reviewed in this section (Section II.B), only Anheuser-Busch was decided
on the merits. All other cases were rejected at the level of admissibility review—the majority
of cases were manifestly ill-founded for either lack of interference with the applicant’s right
148

149

150
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C. Claims Against International Organizations (EPO)
Alongside Article 1 Protocol No. 1 cases on IP resulting out of
direct state action and those originating from private-party litigation, a
separate category of applications arose out of complaints against
international organizations, notably, the European Patent Office (EPO). In
a number of referrals to the ECtHR, the applicants claimed that structural
deficiencies of EPO proceedings resulted in the loss of their patent rights—
mainly through revocation—by the Contracting States to the European
Patent Convention, all of which were also parties to the ECHR. 155 The
Commission and the Strasbourg Court have, however, steadily rejected such
allegations, holding that they were not competent to examine complaints
against international organizations that were not parties to the ECHR in their
own right. The ECHR courts acknowledged that the transfer of powers from
an ECHR State to an international organization (such as the EPO) did not
altogether exclude that State’s responsibility under the ECHR, making the
State’s responsibility dependent on the level of fundamental rights
protection provided by that organization. Given that the European Patent
Convention provided, according to the Commission and the Strasbourg
Court, “equivalent protection” as the ECHR, 156 any transfer of powers to the
EPO was compatible with the ECHR.
The ensuing lack of human rights (or other judicial control) over
the EPO was critically assessed by some commentators who expressed
concerns that, while “the national patent laws of European’s [sic] various
nations must all operate in accordance with principles of human rights[,] . .
. no such check is placed upon the operations of the European Patent Office
itself.” 157 In the latest of the ECtHR decisions on the EPO, however, the
or for no appearance of arbitrariness or unfairness on the part of domestic courts involved
in the proportionality analysis. Most of the cases discussed in Section II.A (on state direct
action) were similarly rejected at the admissibility stage, with only Bălan and SIA
AKKA/LAA reaching examination on the merits.
Heinz v. Contracting States Party to the European Patent Convention Insofar as They Are
High Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, App. No.
21090/92 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 10, 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2593;
Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2868; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4410; Lenzing
AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4408; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no.
40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204.
On the observance of human rights in the EPO’s practice, see Agnieszka Kupzok, Human
Rights in the Case Law of the EPO Boards of Appeal, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 311.
Jeremy Phillips, EPO Not Bound by Human Rights Convention, IPKAT (Nov. 23, 2004),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2004/11/epo-not-bound-by-human-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/37CD-HXFV]. More generally, for a criticism of the lack of judicial review
155

156

157
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ECtHR emphasized that the presumption of “equivalent protection” can be
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is found that the
protection of Convention rights is manifestly deficient. 158
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION AS A
COUNTERWEIGHT TO IP PROTECTION (BUT ALSO AS GROUNDS FOR
IT?)
In addition to the right to property protection for intellectual
property, the ECHR safeguards a series of other fundamental rights of
relevance for IP, which have equal—if not higher—value 159 and against which
IP rights must be balanced. The first of these rights is, without doubt, the
right to freedom of expression and information guaranteed under Article
10 of the ECHR and is sometimes called the European First Amendment. 160
Claims of users form the vast majority of disputes brought to the Convention
organs under this right. On a few occasions, however, Article 10 of the
ECHR was invoked by the rightsholders themselves either as grounds for

of EPO decisions, see Jochen Pagenberg, The ECJ on the Draft Agreement for a European
and Community Patent Court—Hearing of May 18, 2010, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 695, 700–05 (2010).
ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009,
CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204, para. 1.
On the hierarchy of the ECHR rights, see Peggy Ducoulombier, Interaction Between
Human Rights: Are All Human Rights Equal?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 39, 45–46, observing in particular
that the “strength” of ECHR rights can be determined based on the scope of the margin of
appreciation allocated to states in relation to each such right and noting that, following this
logic, the ECHR’s property provision, “in respect of which the margin usually deploys its full
effect,” is inferior to, among others, the right to freedom of expression and the right to the
protection of private life “for which the margin plays an important albeit variable role.” The
freedom of expression specifically, indeed, benefits from a privileged position in the
European constitutional order, constituting, according to the Strasbourg Court, “one of the
essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress
and for the development of every man.” ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom, no.
5493/72, Dec. 7, 1976, CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, para. 49.
Dirk Voorhoof, Het Europese “First Amendment”: de vrijheid van expressie en informatie
en de rechtspraak van het EHRM betreffende art. 10 EVRM (1994-1995), 1995
MEDIAFORUM (Amsterdam) 11; CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU
PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE 166 (2004).
158

159

160
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stronger protection of their essentially economic interests 161 or to justify the
right to express oneself via trademark registration. 162
The only two areas of IP law which have, so far, given rise to
proceedings under the ECHR’s right to freedom of expression are copyright
(Section III.A) and trademarks (Section III.B), although a claim on a
potential violation of freedom of expression and information in the field of
trade secrets is currently (as of March 2020) pending before the Strasbourg
Court. 163

A. The Impact of the Convention’s Right to Freedom of Expression on
Copyright Law
The oldest type of conflict between IP and human rights faced by
the ECtHR concerns copyright and freedom of expression. 164 Already in
See the AEPI case discussed infra Section III.A.3. There is also the idea that, insofar as
copyright is “the engine of free expression,” freedom of expression could support, in theory,
a protection claim. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). However, it is likely that
the “engine” argument is more suitable as a justification for the protection of the rights of
users than those of copyright holders, as this argument explains the rationale for (or goal of)
the grant of protection. It does not address the nature of the right at stake. Thus, property
protection for IP may well be argued to ultimately advance freedom of expression interests.
This is, essentially, what stands behind the utilitarian theories on the justification of copyright
protection. It is in this spirit, for instance, that the protection of arts and sciences is
understood in the U.S. Constitution as the purpose behind the grant of economic (most
frequently property) rights to the holders of copyrights and patents. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
See the cases discussed infra Section III.B.2.
ECtHR, Diasamidze v. Georgia, nos. 49071/12, 51940/12, communicated on September
14, 2016.
For a comparative analysis of the approaches taken by the ECtHR and another
supranational court in Europe—the CJEU—towards resolving the conflicts between copyright
and freedom of expression, see Elena Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of
Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective, 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 115
(2016); Alain Strowel, Pondération entre liberté d’expression et droit d’auteur sur Internet:
161

162
163

164

de la réserve des juges de Strasbourg à une concordance pratique par les juges de
Luxembourg, 100 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 889 (2014). Most

recently, the CJEU faced the conflict of copyright and freedom of expression in three
decisions in the intersection of copyright, freedom of artistic expression, and freedom of the
press. See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(July
29,
2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=20368
6; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1950544; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck
(July
29,
2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1951971.
For commentary on these important decisions, see Geiger & Izyumenko, supra
note 6; Caterina Sganga, A Decade of Fair Balance Doctrine, and How to Fix It: Copyright
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1968, some ten years after the Convention’s enforcement mechanism—the
ECtHR—was incepted, the Convention institutions had to decide on the
compatibility of copyright protection for compilations of television
programs with Article 10 of the Convention. 165 Over the years, the conflict
has developed from being more or less ignored by the Convention
institutions (Section III.A.1) to becoming fully acknowledged in the wake of
the expansion of copyright protection and its enforcement mechanisms in
the digital environment (Section III.A.2). Furthermore, as already
mentioned, Article 10 was scrutinized for not only its potential to further
widen public access to protected works, but also from the standpoint of its
capacity to provide an even stronger protection to the exclusive rights of IP
holders (Section III.A.3).

1. Emergence of A Conflict: Copyright’s Monopoly on Information
and the Freedom of Expression of “Infringers”
The first Convention case on copyright and freedom of expression
(and on the conflict of IP and human rights in general), N.V. Televizier v.
Netherlands, 166 arose out of a complaint filed by Televizier, the Dutch
Versus Fundamental Rights Before the CJEU From Promusicae to Funke Medien, Pelham
and Spiegel Online, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683 (2019); Thom Snijders & Stijn van
Deursen, The Road Not Taken—the CJEU Sheds Light on the Role of Fundamental Rights
in the European Copyright Framework—A Case Note on the Pelham, Spiegel Online and
Funke Medien Decisions, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1176 (2019),

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-019-00883-0 [https://perma.cc/B8PW-KAUT]; Bernd
Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Sample, Sample in My Song, Can They Tell Where You
Are From? The Pelham Judgment—Part I, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Nov. 6, 2019),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/11/06/sample-sample-in-my-song-can-they-tellwhere-you-are-from-the-pelham-judgment-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/H2PJ-VBXJ]; Bernd
Justin Jütte, CJEU Permits Sampling of Phonograms Under a de Minimis Rule and the
Quotation Exception, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 827 (2019); see also Christophe Geiger
& Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in
the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
131 (2019); Jonathan Griffiths, European Union Copyright Law and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights—Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinions in (C-469/17) Funke Medien,
(C-476/17) Pelham GmbH and (C-516/17) Spiegel Online, 20 ERA FORUM 35 (2019);
Daniël Jongsma, AG Szpunar on Copyright’s Relation to Fundamental Rights: One Step
Forward and Two Steps Back?, 2019 IPRINFO 1 (2019); Bernd Justin Jütte & João Pedro
Quintais, Advocate General Turns Down the Music—Sampling is Not a Fundamental Right
Under EU Copyright Law, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 654 (2019).
See N.V. Televizier v. Netherlands, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
782 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73428 (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 166–173). The ECtHR was established on January 21, 1959, when
the first members of the court were elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COURT IN BRIEF, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAX4-UENR] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 782. For more on this
case, see Harvard Law Review Ass’n, International Law—European Convention on Human
165

166
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publisher of a weekly magazine which contained details on forthcoming
radio and television programs of the country’s five broadcasting
corporations. In response to Televizier’s publications of these programs,
those broadcasters and an organization which periodically made
compilations of their programs called Centraal Bureau voor den Omroep
in Nederland (Dutch Central Broadcasting Office) instituted civil
proceedings against Televizier.
In those proceedings, it was alleged that the applicant, when
publishing information about forthcoming radio and television programs,
had made use of the compilations of the Broadcasting Office in violation of
the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912. 167 Pursuant to section 10 of that Act,
copyright protection extended even to works that were not of a distinctive
or personal character. 168 After a series of court decisions, the Supreme Court
of the Netherlands eventually affirmed the Broadcasting Office’s (but not
the corporations’) copyright in the compilations by finding that copyright in
a text lacking personal character could be violated not only by a literal
reproduction of the text but also by its reproduction in a revised form. 169
Televizier contested this finding before the European Commission
of Human Rights, maintaining that, as a consequence of the Dutch Supreme
Court’s decision, broadcasting corporations that also published weekly
magazines or had financial interest in such magazines had an unjustifiable
monopoly over the news services on forthcoming radio and television
programs in the Netherlands. 170 This amounted, in the applicant company’s
opinion, to a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the
Convention. 171
The European Commission of Human Rights declared the
application admissible as it gave rise to a number of important issues
regarding the interpretation of the Convention and held that the applicant
company was a “victim” within the meaning of the Convention. 172 However,
the court never reached the merits of the case because an out-of-court
settlement was reached between the parties. 173 Televizier was absorbed into
one of the five broadcasting corporations and was thereafter allowed to
publish the complete programs of all broadcasting organizations.
Rights—Commission Decides to Consider Dutch Copyright Decision Challenged on
Freedom of Expression Grounds, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1798 (1967); Melville Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA

L. REV. 1180, 1185 (1970).
N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 784.
The Dutch Copyright Act (Vevam) (2015), https://www.vevam.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/Dutch-Copyright-Act-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMZ8-6ZYT].
HR 25 juni 1965, NJ 1966, 116 (Televizier/Netherlands) (Neth.).
N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 785.
167
168

169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.

564

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the Dutch Copyright Act of
1912, on which the proceedings against the applicant company were based,
were replaced by new legislation—namely, the new Broadcasting Act of 1967
and the Royal Decree of 1969. The Broadcasting Act of 1967, in particular,
envisaged that the newly created coordinating broadcasting authority—
Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting,
NOS)—was to compile the complete program listings on information
supplied by various licensed broadcasting organizations. It then had to make
available those listings to all broadcasting organizations for reproduction and
publication in their own program magazines. In addition, short summaries
of the lists were to be sent to daily newspapers, those appearing at least three
times a week, and certain foreign publishers. Pursuant to Article 22 of the
Broadcasting Act of 1967, any other reproduction or publication of these
lists without the consent of the broadcasting authority constituted an
infringement of copyright and entailed civil liability.
Thus, the new legislative arrangement did not completely solve the
problem from which the Televizier application to the EСtHR arose. This
subsequently resulted in a challenge of the new legislation and the Dutch
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 1912 Copyright Act in Televizier by
another company on analogous grounds. This time, the challenge involved
the publisher of weekly “general interest” magazines in the Netherlands—
De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. (D.G.P.N.V.)—whose petition for distributing
complete lists of television and radio program data was refused because of
the Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the Royal Decree of 1969. 174 The Royal
Decree of 1969, in particular, distinguished between publishers of daily and
three-times-weekly papers and weekly “general interest” magazines, such
that the former were permitted to publish a summary of program data
whereas the latter were not. The applicant company brought its case before
the European Commission of Human Rights complaining that such a
refusal constituted an unjustified interference with its right to freely receive
and impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR. 175
D.G.P.N.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13
(1976). On this case, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5,
at 261–63, 273, 277–79; and Christoph Beat Graber, Copyright and Access—A Human
Rights Perspective, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING
SOCIETIES? 71, 85 (Christoph Beat Graber et al. eds., 2005).
On the conflict between copyright and freedom of information as protected by Article 10
of the ECHR, see generally GEIGER, supra note 160; Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right,
Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in 5 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007); Hugenholtz, supra note
16; Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil
Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, and Access, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 287 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2006);
Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era, supra
174
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Even though the European Commission of Human Rights declared
the application admissible as “rais[ing] substantial issues of law and of
fact,” 176 it nevertheless found no violation of the Convention. It first
considered that the freedom to impart information of the kind at issue could
only be granted to “the author, the originator or otherwise the intellectual
owner.” 177 As a result, there had been no interference with the applicant
company’s rights since it had been prevented from publishing the
information which it did not yet possess. 178 The Commission further noted
that the free flow of such information had not been jeopardized in any way
since the general public could inform itself about the program schedule
through a variety of other sources. 179 Finally, the Commission held that the
mere commercial interest of the applicant company, which might have been
compromised by its competitive disadvantage to other magazines, did not
fall within the scope of Article 10 of the ECHR. 180
As Professor Hugenholtz observed in his seminal work on
“Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe,” the “Commission’s
conclusion that third parties may never invoke Article 10 freedoms with
respect to ‘single-source’ data is obviously erroneous,” as “[f]reedom of
expression under Article 10 is not confined to speech that is original with
the speaker.” 181
Nevertheless, the Commission’s pronouncement on the conflict of
copyright with freedom of information in De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V.
remained the sole authority on the subject for around twenty years. It was
not until the end of the 1990s when the conflict was brought up again, this
time in the context of a claim by the French public national television
channel, France 2. 182
note 164. For further references to numerous sources exploring the relationship between
copyright and freedom of expression, see Yin Harn Lee, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression: A Literature Review (CREATe Working Paper No. 2015/04, 2015),
https://zenodo.org/record/18132/files/CREATe-Working-Paper-2015-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5J6-Q5KQ].
D.G.P.N.V., App. No. 5178/71, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13, 24.
De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, para. 84 (Eur.
Comm’n
on
H.R.
July
6,
1976),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22appno%22:[%225178/71%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-95643%22]}.
176
177

178
179
180
181

Id.
Id. para. 86.
Id. paras. 87–88.
Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12.

Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-28411. On this case, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12–13; Strowel &
Tulkens, supra note 175, at 306–07; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 263–64; Geiger &
Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16, at 332–33; Graber, supra
note 174, at 85–86.
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In November 1988, as part of a theatrical news television program
devoted to a famous actress, France 2 broadcasted an information report on
the restoration of a theatre on the Champs-Elysées. In that report, the
camera filmed for a few moments (forty-nine seconds) the wall frescoes by
the painter Edouard Vuillard. On those grounds, the painter’s assigns filed,
via the copyright collecting society SPADEM (Société de la Propriété
Artistique et des Dessins et Modèles), a claim for damages for the broadcast
of works without payment of royalties.
The High Court of Paris first found against the painter’s estate 183 on
the grounds that the presentation of the paintings amounted to a “brief
quotation” 184 justified by the critical or informatory nature of the television
report in which they were incorporated. This judgment was, however,
overturned on appeal, 185 and France 2 was ordered to pay 12,000 francs in
damages. According to the appellate court, since some of the painter’s
frescoes were shown in their entirety, their representation could not amount
to a “brief quotation.” Finding that the frescoes were not part of the decor
of the theatre whose restoration was the topic of the broadcast, the appellate
court held that the communication of the frescoes of Vuillard to the public
was not justified on this occasion by the informational character of the work
in which their representation was incorporated. The applicant’s subsequent
appeal to the French Supreme Court was equally unsuccessful. 186 The
supreme court found that the integral representation of a work, whatever its
form and duration, could not be regarded as a brief quotation within the
meaning of the French Intellectual Property Code. France 2 then appealed
to the European Commission of Human Rights, arguing that the supreme
court’s decision, which precluded the television channel from exercising the
right of quotation in artistic matters, violated its right to freedom of
expression.
The Commission first noted that “the facts complained of by the
applicant constitute[d] an interference with the applicant’s right to freely
communicate information.” 187 It then established, without difficulty, that the
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 5,
1991 (Fr.).
Within the meaning of an internal exception to copyright envisaged in Article 41(3) of the
French Law on Literary and Artistic Property of March 11, 1957, which was, since July 1,
1992, incorporated in Article L. 122-5(3)(a) of the French Intellectual Property Code of July
1, 1992, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=322949 [https://perma.cc/ZK3XH5SG] (available only in French).
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, July 7, 1992 (Fr.).
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 4, 1995, Bull.
Civ. I, no. 296 (Fr.).
Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French and translation by authors),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411.
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interference was prescribed by law—namely, the national copyright law
provisions on the rights of exploitation—and that the text of those provisions
was “adequately accessible” and easily foreseeable by the applicant, “a
television channel, whose activity is directly related to the legislation on
intellectual property.” 188 As to the purpose of interference, the Commission
considered that it was “intended to protect the rights of others, in particular
the rights of authors of literary and artistic works.” 189 The core of the analysis
then centered, as is often the case, on the question of proportionality. In this
regard, the European Commission pointed out that:
[I]t is not required to decide whether the decision was consistent
with domestic law, but to consider it with reference to Article 10
. . . of the Convention. The Commission is not therefore required
to decide on the interpretation of the notion of ‘brief quotation’.
It also recalls that it is normally not for the Convention organs to
resolve, under paragraph 2 of Article 10 . . ., the conflicts which
may arise between, on the one hand, the right to freely
communicate information and, on the other hand, the right of
authors whose works are communicated. The Commission must
assess whether there is a proportional link between the limitation
to the above-mentioned freedom of the applicant and the
interests protected by this limitation.
The Commission notes that the applicant was ordered to pay
damages because of the absence of the payment of royalties due
to the author of the frescoes, which have been fully disseminated.
Given the circumstances of the case, the Commission considers
that it was reasonable for the relevant domestic courts, in the
interest of the author and his assigns, to take account of the rights
of these latter over the works, which have been after all freely
disseminated by the applicant. Consequently, the Commission
considers that the restriction or penalty at issue constituted a
measure necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of
others. 190
Like the De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. ruling, the Commission’s
reasoning in France 2 has been criticized in the literature, this time for the
Commission’s excessive cautiousness in intervening in the area of copyright
from an external freedom of expression perspective. 191 However, when
compared to the first two decisions on copyright and freedom of expression
involving broadcasting organizations’ monopoly in television listings, the
analysis in France 2 might appear as a step forward. This is because in
188
189
190
191

Id.
Id.
Id.

Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 13; Graber, supra note 174, at 86.
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France 2, the Commission admitted that copyright regulation constitutes an

“interference” with the right to freedom of expression and information and
hence is not immune, as it is often argued, from an external human rights
review. 192 A real breakthrough in the court’s treatment of the free expression
and copyright conflict, however, did not occur until recently when the
ECtHR faced the problems posed by the enforcement of copyright on the
free flow of information in the new digital environment.

2. Further Development of the “Infringers” Argument in the Digital
Environment: File-Sharing on the Internet and Website
Blocking
As mentioned above, the latest developments in the Convention’s
copyright and freedom of expression case law all concern, unsurprisingly,
the measures of copyright enforcement online. 193 In the past few years, the
court has addressed the questions of potentially excessive copyright
enforcement techniques and their effects on the Convention right to
freedom of expression and information on three occasions.
The first two cases, decided almost simultaneously in early 2013,
pertained to the issues of unauthorized dissemination of copyrightprotected works on the internet. One of the cases, Donald v. France, 194
In fact, for a long time, courts in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have been very
reluctant to admit any freedom of expression defense in copyright law, considering that any
potential conflict has already been internally addressed by legislatures through the legal
boundaries of the exclusive right. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (finding no need to expand the fair use doctrine “[i]n view of the
First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use”); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372,
375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]opyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.”); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property.”); Television New Zealand Ltd. v. Newsmonitor
Servs. Ltd. [1994] 2 NZLR 91 (N.Z.); Cour de cassation [Cass] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 1e civ., July 4, 1995, 167 RIDA 259 (Fr.); CB-Infobank I, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 16, 1997, GRUR 459 (1997) (Ger.); Karikaturwiedergabe,
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 9, 1997, GRUR INT. 896 (1998)
(Austria).
See Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era,
supra note 164 (analyzing the influence of the right to freedom of expression and information
on European copyright law in the digital context).
ECtHR,
Donald
v.
France,
no.
36769/08,
Jan.
10,
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French). For an assessment of this
case, see Geiger & Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16; Dirk
Voorhoof & Inger Høedt-Rasmussen, ECHR: Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression,
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/
2013/01/25/echr-copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression/ [https://perma.cc/47TP-48QL]; Paul
192
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concerned a conviction for copyright infringement in France by three
fashion photographers, one of whom had taken photographs of Paris
fashion shows and posted them on a website of the applicants’ online
fashion magazine. Since the pictures were published without authorization
from the fashion houses concerned, the fashion houses, together with the
French Fashion Federation, filed a suit for copyright infringement. The
three photographers based their defense on Article 10 of the ECHR and
Article L. 122-5 9° of the French Intellectual Property Code (an internal
copyright exception allowing the reproduction of artistic works for news
reporting). The photographers, however, ultimately lost in national
proceedings, as the national courts considered Article L. 122-5 9°
inapplicable to the creations of designers and fashion houses, even though
the latter were also protected under French copyright law. As a result, the
photographers were ordered to pay fines and damages totaling more than
250,000 euros.
In the wake of that national court’s decision, the photographers
applied to the Strasbourg Court, insisting that the fashion photographs
contained information of general public interest and that their posting on a
website, even for sale, amounted to a proportionate exercise of freedom of
expression.
A similar issue of conflicting copyright and freedom of expression
rights arose almost simultaneously before the ECtHR in another highprofile dispute by two co-founders of the notorious “The Pirate Bay” (TPB)
file-sharing service. The co-founders were criminally charged in Sweden for
contributing, through their service, to the infringement of copyrights on
music, films, and computer games. 195 As in the case with the French
photographers, the national proceedings ended unfavorably for the TPB cofounders, who received prison sentences of ten and eight months
respectively, together with joint liability for damages amounting to
L.C. Torremans, Ashby Donald and Others v. France, Application 36769/08, ECtHR, 5th
section, Judgment of 10 January 2013, 4 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 95 (2014); Strowel,
supra note 164; Fabien Marchadier, Le conflit entre le droit d’auteur et la liberté
d’expression devant la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, 304 LÉGIPRESSE 221
(2013); Alain Zollinger, Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression: le discours de la méthode
(Commentaire CEDH, 10 janv. 2013, n° 36769/08, Ashby Donald et a. c/ France), 5 PROP.
INTELL.

7 (2013).
ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. For comments on this case, see Geiger &
Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16; Dirk Voorhoof & Inger
Høedt-Rasmussen, ECHR: Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression II (The Pirate Bay),
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/
2013/03/20/echr-copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression-ii-the-pirate-bay/
[https://perma.cc/
47TP-48QL]; J. Jones, Internet Pirates Walk the Plank with Article 10 Kept at Bay: Neij and
Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, 35(11) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 695 (2013); Strowel, supra
note 164.
195
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approximately five million euros. According to the Swedish courts, TPB
had furthered illegal file-sharing in such a way that the persons responsible
for the website became criminally liable. 196
Like the applicants in Ashby Donald, the TPB co-founders sought
justice in the ECtHR. They maintained that Article 10 of the ECHR
enshrined the right to offer an automatic service of transferring unprotected
material between users—in line with the basic principles of freedom of
communication on the internet—and convicting persons responsible for that
service for the acts committed by its users ran afoul of those principles.
In each case, the ECtHR held that the applicants’ convictions
constituted an interference with Article 10 of the ECHR. Although the court
ultimately found no violation of that provision, it engaged in an elaborate
analysis of the proportionality of interference with the aim of copyright
protection, thereby departing from its previous reluctance expressed in
France 2 to resolve “the conflicts which may arise between, on the one hand,
the right to freely communicate information and, on the other hand, the
right of authors whose works are communicated.” 197
According to the ECtHR, the factors that stood against the
applicants were the commercial character of their expression198 and the fact
that the information contained in the shared material did not contribute—
unlike what the applicants in Donald had claimed—to the general debate of
public interest 199 and, therefore, “[could not] reach the same level [of
protection] as that afforded to political expression and debate.” 200
Furthermore, restrictions on Article 10 were all the more justified by the
fact that the proprietary interests of copyright holders were equally protected
by the Convention by virtue of the applicability to intellectual property of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (protection of property). 201 The
Notably, the court of appeals pointed out that the TPB had created the possibility of
uploading and storing Torrent files, which is a database and a tracker-function, and thus had
not merely offered data transfers or caching. The court of appeals also noted that the
defendants had committed intentional offenses and had not taken any precautionary
measures, and the torrent files, which referred to copyright-protected material, had not been
removed despite warnings and requests for removal.
See Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French and translation by authors),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411.
Compare ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 39 (available only in French), with ECtHR,
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712.
ECtHR,
Donald
v.
France,
no.
36769/08,
Jan.
10,
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 39 (available only in French).
ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712.
See supra Part II.
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court also emphasized the “nature and severity of the penalties imposed” 202
on the applicants but held that, in neither case, could those penalties be
regarded as disproportionate. 203
The court’s analysis in Donald and The Pirate Bay denoted a
prominent and important shift. Through these cases, the ECtHR made it
clear that even illegal and profit-making sharing of copyright-protected
material was not devoid of freedom of expression guarantees, and, in certain
circumstances, it was simply impossible to ignore the freedom of expression
checks to assess the impact of the copyright framework on the enjoyment of
human rights in Europe. 204 The eagerness of the court to give more scrutiny
from external human rights perspective to internal copyright regulation was
demonstrated again in another Article 10 decision, rendered one year after
the cases discussed above. Akdeniz v. Turkey 205 concerned blocking access
to the websites myspace.com and last.fm in Turkey, at the request of the
Professional Union of Phonogram Producers, on the grounds that the
websites were disseminating musical works in violation of copyright. The
applicant—who had applied to the ECtHR as a regular user of the websites
in question—complained about the collateral effects of blocking and argued
that it amounted to a disproportionate response in light of Article 10 of the
ECHR.
Like in Donald and The Pirate Bay, the ECtHR engaged in the
proportionality evaluation, providing certain guidance on how this type of
conflict can be approached from the freedom of expression standpoint.
Although the application was declared inadmissible for the applicant’s lack
of victim status, 206 the ECtHR implied that the outcome might have been
ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712.
In The Pirate Bay case, the court took into consideration that “the domestic courts found
that the applicants had not taken any action to remove the torrent files in question, despite
having been urged to do so. Instead they had been indifferent to the fact that copyrightprotected works had been the subject of file-sharing activities via TPB.” Id. In regards to the
French photographers in Donald, the court reasoned, rather surprisingly, that the applicants
“ha[d] not produced any evidence” to prove that the substantial criminal fines imposed on
them had “financially strangled” them. ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10,
2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 43 (available only in French and
translated in 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 354 (2014)).
For a joint analysis of the Donald and The Pirate Bay rulings, see Geiger & Izyumenko,
Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16.
ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20877/10, Mar. 11, 2014,
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710 (available only in French). On this case, see
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright
Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 43 (2016); Strowel, supra note 164, at 890–95, 909.
ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20877/10, Mar. 11, 2014,
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, para. 29 (available only in French).
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different depending on how the website was used (actively or passively), 207
the collateral effects of blocking on legitimate content, 208 the value of the
blocked information in terms of its contribution to matters of general
interest, 209 the availability of alternative means of accessing that
information, 210 and the comparative importance of IP as a human right
against which the rights of internet users had to be balanced. 211

3. Freedom of Expression as a Restriction to Access: Article 10
Invoked on the Part of the Rightsholders
As stated in the introduction to this section, freedom of expression
was not always invoked before the ECtHR as a justification for broader
access to protected works. Quite to the contrary, on certain occasions,
Article 10 was raised by rightsholders in an attempt to further strengthen
and broaden protection. For example, in the case of AEPI S.A., 212 the lack
of protection for all musical works administered by the Greek collecting
society—AEPI (Hellenic Society for the Protection of Intellectual
Property)—when it could not secure an approval from the Ministry of
Culture was challenged by AEPI on freedom of expression grounds. AEPI
complained that, while its request for approval was pending before the
Ministry of Culture, it was unable to sue on behalf of its members and
ensure that their works were not disseminated without royalty payments.
AEPI maintained that artistic expression, including music, was an integral
part of the rights protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, and this protection
encompassed the right of the creator of a literary or artistic work to exercise
“total control over such work, as desired.” 213 According to the AEPI, it
followed that “no one [could] break by whatever means the link between
the creator and his work, for example, by disseminating the work without
the rightsholder’s permission.” 214 The ECtHR rejected this overbroad
reading of Article 10, not because of the substance of the applicant
organization’s complaint, but rather because the court did not consider the
applicant—a legal entity—eligible to raise this sort of action. The court
explained:
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant, as a
legal entity, does not purport to be itself a victim of a violation of
the right guaranteed by Article 10, since the restrictions referred
207
208
209
210
211

Id. para. 27.
Id. para. 28.
Id. para. 26.
Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 28.

ECtHR, AEPI S.A. v. Greece (dec.), no. 48679/99,
CE:ECHR:2001:0503DEC004867999 (available only in French).
Id. para. 3 (translated from French by the authors).
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by it—namely the dissemination of musical works without
appropriate authorization—affected the artist members of the
AEPI but not the AEPI itself. It also notes that Law no.
2121/1993 [on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters]
itself distinguishes between property rights (Article 3 of the Law)
and moral rights (Article 4) of the creators of works of art. Articles
54 and 55 of this Law entrust organisations such as the applicant
the management of only the property rights of the artists, and not
their moral rights, which are closely related to the creators’
personality. Moreover, Article 12 § 2 of Law no. 2121/1993
provides that the moral right cannot be transferred. The applicant
cannot, therefore, be considered a victim of a violation of Article
10 in this case. 215
It is noteworthy, however, that the court did not exclude the possibility for
the authors to raise the claim under Article 10 in order to restrict access to
their works in circumstances analogous to those surrounding the claim by
AEPI.

B. Freedom of Expression in the Trademark Context
In addition to copyright, another intellectual property right with
which the right to freedom of expression comes into potential conflict is the
right to the protection of trademarks. So far, the interplay of trademarks and
free speech gave rise to two types of disputes before the Convention
institutions: those pertaining to unauthorized use of trademarks by third
parties for socially important purposes, including parodic criticism (Section
III.B.1), and claims coming from potential trademark holders challenging
the refusals of their applications for trademark registration (Section III.B.2).

1. Unauthorized Trademark Use and Its Justifiability on the Basis of
Free Expression
The use of a trademark for parodic criticism was tested on freedom
of speech grounds before the Convention organs only once. This was on
application in the beginning of the 1990s to the European Commission by
an Austrian anti-smoking association and its chairman. 216 As part of an
advertising campaign against smoking, the association sold pamphlets,
215

Id.

Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":
["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}. On this case, see WOLFGANG SAKULIN,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER
EUROPEAN LAW 284–86 (2011).
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posters, and stickers depicting the caricature of a skeleton riding a camel
and holding a cigarette in front of the camel. Underneath this picture, the
following slogan was written: “ONLY A CAMEL WALKS MILES FOR A
CIGARETTE.” 217 Subsequently, an international tobacco company filed a
lawsuit against the applicants, demanding that they discontinue the use of
the slogan and pay compensation. According to the company, the publicity
distorted its advertising slogan, “I walk miles for a CAMEL,” 218 in a satirical
and ironic manner, which could be understood as a disparagement of the
company’s products.
After a series of lower court decisions, the Austrian Supreme Court
held against the applicants, imposing a prohibition on using the slogan, the
picture, and the words “KAMEL” or “CAMEL” in the applicants’ antismoking publicity. 219 In particular, the supreme court found that a
considerable part of the general public would understand the applicants’
publicity to be a clear allusion to the plaintiff’s cigarettes as being especially
strong and unhealthy, and the applicants had not been entitled to select the
plaintiff’s trademark in order to criticize tobacco products in general.
The applicants contested the impugned prohibition before the
Commission of Human Rights, arguing that their rights under Article 10 of
the ECHR had been violated. The Commission confirmed that the tobacco
industry had to tolerate a public debate concerning the risks of smoking
even if information about health risks was presented in an ironical or
satirical manner. 220 Nevertheless, it found no justification for applicant’s use
of the plaintiff’s particular cigarette brand, agreeing with the domestic courts’
balancing of the plaintiff’s reputation, the applicants’ rights, and the public
interest in the dissemination of the slogan and caricature in question. 221
According to the Commission, by using the CAMEL trademark, “the
applicants had not merely informed the public about health risks of smoking
in general, but presented their criticism in the form of a caricature with an
ironical slogan distorting the plaintiff’s trademarks and its advertising

In German, the slogan read: NUR EIN KAMEL GEHT MEILENWEIT FÜR EINE
ZIGARETTE. “In German language, ‘Kamel’ is a pejorative term for a person acting in a
foolish or stupid manner.” Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria,
No. 17200/90 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{"fulltext":["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}.
“Ich gehe meilenweit für eine CAMEL,” in German.
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], Jan. 9, 1990, 4 Ob 168/89,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_19900109_OGH0002_0040OB00168_
8900000_000/JJT_19900109_OGH0002_0040OB00168_8900000_000.pdf (Austria).
Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":
["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}.
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slogans.” 222 The Commission, therefore, concluded that “the Austrian court
decisions, in particular the Supreme Court’s decision . . . , did not go beyond
the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in assessing the
proportionality of an interference with the freedom of expression in
accordance with Article 10 . . . of the Convention.” 223
About fifteen years later, the French Supreme Court took an
opposite position in an identical dispute that also involved the CAMEL
trademark and its use in a parody by an anti-smoking association. Unlike
the European Commission of Human Rights, the French court was ready
to fully engage in the external evaluation of the compatibility of trademark
law with freedom of expression and came to the conclusion that freedom of
expression justified the use of a trademark for the purposes of criticism. 224
Similarly, in other jurisdictions, starting in the early 2000s, courts began
giving preference to freedom of expression in cases on parodic use—for
social criticism—of rightsholders’ well-known brands. 225
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the Commission of Human Rights was
of the opinion that only in exceptional circumstances could a trademark
owner be obliged to accept a breach of his rights resulting from
unauthorized trademark use. This position was confirmed less than one
year after the decision in CAMEL—another case concerning trademark use
for socially important purposes—this time in drug prescriptions. 226
The applicants were a physician, a pharmacist, and a medical
insurance fund and wanted to proceed with a specific manner of prescribing
drugs. They planned to recommend the use of the drug Tanderil “or
equivalent other product” from an agreed list of drugs that were medically
and pharmaceutically considered equivalent. The list was drawn up by a
222
223
224

Id.
Id.
CNMTR v. Société JT, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e

civ., Oct. 19, 2006, Bull. civ. II, No. 1601 (Fr.). For an overview of a number of other French
decisions that allowed freedom of expression to prevail in cases of trademark parodies, see
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual
Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 268 (2004); Christophe
Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression—The Proportionality of Criticism, 38
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 317 (2007).
See, on the parodic reproduction of a brewery’s trademark on T-shirts for the purpose of
criticizing racial exploitation: Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. African Breweries Int’l
(Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark Int’l 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) at 35–36 (S. Afr.), and, on artistic
use of Louis Vuitton’s design in a painting that is critical of society’s consumerism: GHDHA
4 mei 2011, KG ZA 11-294 2011, 389526 m.nt. (Nadia Plesner/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA)
(Neth.).
Nijs v. Netherlands, App. No. 15497/89 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1992),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22docname%22:[%22Nijs%20v.%20Netherlands%22],%2
2itemid%22:[%22001-1355%22]}. For more on this case, see SAKULIN, supra note 216, at
259–61.
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designated Dutch authority—the Netherlands Commission Information
Drug Prices 227—and consisted of registered brand names and names of
generic drugs. The applicants requested Ciba-Geigy, a pharmaceutical
company that owned the trademark and name Tanderil in the Benelux, to
provide them with a declaration that this procedure for prescribing drugs (to
which the applicants sought to give publicity) was not contrary to the law and
that the company would refrain from legal proceedings challenging it.
Following Ciba-Geigy’s refusal to agree, the applicants initiated court
proceedings seeking a declaratory judgment on the same issue. Their claim,
however, was rejected in all instances.
Domestic courts based their decisions on the Benelux Court’s
interpretation of the relevant provision of the Uniform Benelux Trademark
Act. The courts stated that the use of a trademark in such a way that its
owner would suffer damages was only permitted if such use could be
justified by exceptional circumstances, which were not present in the case at
hand.
The applicants complained before the European Commission of
Human Rights that the domestic courts’ decision not to declare the drug
prescription procedure lawful was contrary to Article 10 of the ECHR. As
in the French case involving Camel and an anti-smoking association, the
Commission rejected the challenge, finding that “the applicants could
achieve their aim of reducing medical costs by phrasing medical
prescriptions in such a way that the rights of trademark owners are
respected, namely by the mere use of generic names in medical
prescriptions.” 228 Accordingly, “the fact that it was not permissible for the
applicants to use and recommend the particular manner of drafting
prescriptions [was] to be regarded as a proportionate restriction prescribed
by law and [could] therefore be considered necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of the rights of others.” 229
As with the first ECHR cases on copyright and freedom of
expression, the above-discussed approach of the Commission in Article 10
decisions involving trademarks did not face a positive response in the
literature. 230 It is, however, notable that, in the Camel case, the ECtHR
admitted that “[t]he decision of the Austrian courts prohibiting the
applicants from using the words ‘CAMEL’ or ‘KAMEL’ as well as a
particular slogan and picture in their publicity against smoking constitute[d]
See Jonathan P. Man et al., De Commissie Voorlichting Prijzen Geneesmiddelen, 114
PHARMACEUTISCH WEEKBLAD SCI. EDITION 671 (1979).
Nijs v. Netherlands, App. No. 15497/89, para. 1 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1992),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22docname%22:[%22Nijs%20v.%20Netherlands%22],%2
2itemid%22:[%22001-1355%22]}.
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See SAKULIN, supra note 216, at 259–61, 284–86.
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an interference with their right to freedom of expression.” The court had,
231

therefore, allowed the freedom of expression defense as an external limit to
trademark law.
Furthermore, although the Convention institutions found no
violation in the free speech and trademark cases, nowadays, the court could
decide similar disputes differently. This would be in line with the idea that
the Convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions.” 232 New realities might require paying greater
attention to freedom of expression interests in the context of unauthorized
trademark use than was considered necessary at the beginning of the 1990s.
One factor pointing in this direction is the change in the judiciary’s position
on the relationship between trademarks and freedom of expression in
several jurisdictions. As noted above, national courts (for example, the
French Supreme Court) are no longer reluctant to reconsider the scope of
trademark protection through recourse to external freedom of expression
checks and balances.

2. Refusal of Trademark Registration—A Challenge to the Trademark
Applicant’s Freedom of Expression?
Unauthorized use is not the sole instance in which trademark
protection might impact freedom of expression. A quite separate issue arises
when national trademark offices refuse to register the marks of potential
trademark holders on grounds that such signs are either “contrary to public
policy or to accepted principles of morality” 233 or considered to be
deceptive. 234 In this context, trademark applicants usually claim freedom of
expression to support their freedom to use the signs as trademarks. 235 With
Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":
["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, Feb. 18, 1999,
CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002483394, para. 39.
On the E.U. level, this ground for refusing trademark registration is enshrined in
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark (Text with EEA relevance),
art. 7(1)(f), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, [hereinafter Commission Regulation 2017/1001] and Article
4(1)(f) of the Directive (EU) No. 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 December 2015 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade
Marks (Text with EEA relevance), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1 [hereinafter Directive (EU) No.
2015/2436].
Commission Regulation No. 2017/1001, supra note 233, art. 7(1); Directive (EU) No.
2015/2436, supra note 233, art. 4(1)(g).
See Christophe Geiger & Leonardo M. Pontes, Trade Mark Registration, Public Policy,
Morality and Fundamental Rights, in 20 YEARS OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL AT EUIPO,
ANNIVERSARY BOOK, CELEBRATING THE PAST, LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FUTURE 96
(Alicante ed., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009170 [https://perma.cc/E4WE-PWRV];
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respect to deceptive marks, the Strasbourg Court recently considered
whether the refusal to register deceptive marks violates the freedom of
expression of trademark applicants. The case concerned the figurative sign
“CRUCIFIX,” sought to be registered in Romania. 236 The mark was a
combination of a drawing 237 and the word “crucifix” in a design intended to
cover legal services. The National Trademark and Patent Office of Romania
(OSIM) refused registration on the grounds that the mark was deceptive 238
and contrary to public order and morality. 239 With regards to the mark’s
deceptiveness, OSIM observed that the church enjoyed a high level of
public trust, and because of this trust, the use of the “CRUCIFIX” mark for
legal services could mislead the public into believing that such services were
provided by this religious organization. Regarding public order
requirement, OSIM found that the mark’s registration would have infringed
provisions of the National Law on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious
Objects, 240 according to which the church alone had a monopoly on the
manufacturing and marketing of crucifixes.
The applicant challenged OSIM’s decision before the County
Court of Bucharest, alleging a violation of freedom of expression. He also
claimed that he was discriminated against insofar as OSIM had accepted the
registration of other marks containing similar graphic elements. The county

Jonathan Griffiths, Is There a Right to an Immoral Trademark?, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 423 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008); Lisa P. Ramsey, A
Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 16 TRADEMARK REP. 797 (2016); Enrico
Bonadio, Brands, Morality and Public Policy: Some Reflections on the Ban on Registration
of Controversial Trademarks, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 39 (2015); Susan Snedden,

Immoral Trade Marks in the UK and at OHIM: How Would the Redskins Dispute be
Decided There?, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 270 (2016).

ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015,
CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312 (available only in French).
The drawing depicted a stylized cross with floral elements, placed on a base that read
“CRUCIFIX.” The cross was surrounded by a crown in the shape of the letter “C,”
representing stylized laurel leaves.
Romanian Law No. 84/1998 of April 15, 1998, on Trademarks and Geographical
Indications,
art.
5(1)(f),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=207374
[https://perma.cc/R35N-VKMJ] (English translation by the WIPO).
Id., art. 5(1)(i). Note that the European Union’s First Trademarks Directive—First Council
Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1—had not yet been transposed into Romanian
law at the time of the proceedings in the applicant’s case. Article 3(2)(b) of that Directive
stated that “[a]ny Member State may provide that a trade mark shall not be registered or, if
registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid where and to the extent that . . . the trade
mark covers a sign of high symbolic value, in particular a religious symbol.” This provision
can be currently found in Article 4(3)(b) of Directive (EU) No. 2015/2436, supra note 233.
Romanian Law No. 103/1992 on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects, § 1(2)
(1992).
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court held for the applicant and ordered registration of the mark. 241 It
concluded that the Law on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects
was not applicable in the present case since it concerned only the
manufacture and marketing of objects of worship. Consequently, the
registration of the mark did not violate any of the social values defended by
public policy. With regard to the alleged misleading character of the mark
by OSIM, the court found that the mark, combined with the legal services
for which its registration was sought, was not likely to mislead the public as
to the nature, origin, or quality of these services.
OSIM lodged an appeal. It argued that the provisions of the Law
on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects were part of public
policy and, therefore, the owner of the mark could mislead the public into
believing that there was a connection between the applicant and the church.
In the final judgment of the case, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed
the action. 242 The court of appeals, after examining the drawing
accompanying the mark, found that the “average reference” consumer
perceived its religious character as a priority and could, therefore, believe
that a link existed between the church and the owner of the mark. Given
the broad involvement of religious institutions in charitable and aid activities
in various fields, it was possible, in the court’s opinion, that religious
organizations could also provide legal assistance to their believers. Thus, the
court concluded that the trademark applicant could benefit from public
confidence in the church, which made the mark deceptive, and it was,
therefore, unnecessary to examine the conformity of the mark with public
order and morality. Finally, the Bucharest Court of Appeal found that the
refusal to register the trademark did not infringe ECHR provisions on
freedom of expression and non-discrimination. On the latter point, the
court noted that examples cited by the applicant were irrelevant since those
marks contained compound words and complex drawings, which departed
from religious symbols. 243
The applicant complained to the Strasbourg Court that the choice
of the name and graphic representation of the mark “CRUCIFIX” was a
matter of his freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 of the
ECHR), and, by refusing his application, the domestic authorities infringed
County Court of Bucharest, judgment of June 8, 2010 (Rom.) (cited in ECtHR, Dor v.
Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015, CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para.
18).
Bucharest Court of Appeal, judgment of June 21, 2011 (Rom.).
One of the judges on the panel dissented and argued in favor of dismissing the appeal. He
considered that the application for registration could be rejected only if it was contrary to
public order or morality. Recalling that public order concerns the functioning of the state
apparatus and that Romania is a secular state where religion is separated from the state, the
dissenting judge held that religious symbols could not be part of the public order calculus.
241
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on his freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR). Because the court
observed at the outset that the present case should be examined solely under
Article 10 of the Convention as concerning the commercial use of a mark,
the ECtHR rejected the applicant’s claim under this provision as manifestly
ill-founded. 244 It held that the dismissal of the application for trademark
registration amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to
freedom of expression insofar as the mark constituted an important element
of the applicant’s advertising strategy, 245 as advertising is one of the forms of
commercial speech protected by the Convention. However, such
interference was in accordance with the law because the relevant ground of
refusal was provided in Romania’s National Law on Trademarks and
Geographical Indications, 246 pursued a legitimate aim (protection of the
public against false advertising), 247 and was proportionate to this aim.
Regarding the proportionality of the measure, the ECtHR observed the
applicant had:
in no way demonstrated the existence of a link between the legal
services which it intended to provide to the public under the
contested mark and the religious symbol of the crucifix. On the
contrary, he confined himself to asserting that such a choice
related to his freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well
as his freedom of expression. 248
In these circumstances, taking into account the particularly wide margin of
discretion which the national authorities enjoy in regulating commercial and
advertising speech, the national judges were justified in rejecting the
applicant’s claim. 249
The ECtHR has also recently addressed the potential implications
of refusing to register trademarks contrary to public policy and morality on
the trademark applicants’ freedom of expression. 250 The case at issue, Csibi
ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015,
CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para. 57 (available only in French).
Id. para. 42.
Id. paras. 45–46.
Id. para. 47.
Id. para. 53, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 58 (Christophe
Geiger et al. eds., 1992).
Id. paras. 51, 54, 56.
For possible implications of this ground for refusal on freedom of expression rights not of
the trademark applicant, but of the user, see Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo (Eur. Free
Trade Association (EFTA) Court, Apr. 6, 2017), https://report.eftacourt.int/2017/e516/
[https://perma.cc/E6SD-TGF8]. In this case, the court sought to use the public-policymorality ground for refusal to protect from “appropriation,” by means of trademark
registration, works in the public domain (notably, works of art). Although the court, in
principle, accepted that the ground for refusal due to morality and public policy can, in
certain situations, achieve the goal of keeping works in the public domain, it also confirmed
that this ground for refusal does not provide protection to works in the public domain. In
244

245
246
247
248

249
250
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v. Romania, concerned the Romanian trademark registration authority’s
251

refusal to register the applicant’s trademark that read “Szekely Land is not
Romania!” 252 According to the Romanian trademark office, claiming that
Szekely Land (an unofficial territory name for three Romanian counties)
was not part of Romania could lead to the idea of territorial separation. The
trademark office found this to be contrary to the constitutional provisions
on the unitary character of the Romanian State and, consequently, to the
national trademark law that does not allow the registration of trademarks
contrary to public order. 253
The applicant contested the office’s reasoning, which was
subsequently affirmed by the courts, before the ECtHR, contending that the
domestic authorities had unlawfully restricted the voicing of the applicant’s
strong belief contained in the expression at issue on public order grounds. 254
According to the applicant, his statement concerned a fictitious land that
could be defined only historically and ethnographically, not politically. 255
The Strasbourg Court, however, was not persuaded and found that
the interference with the applicant’s right was justified under the national
trademark law provision excluding trademarks that are contrary to public
order or good morals from protection and registration. The court reasoned
that such an interference pursued the legitimate aims of protecting
Romania’s territorial integrity, national security, and public order. 256
order to be excluded from registration on this ground, works of art have to pass the threshold
of “enjoy[ing] a particular status as prominent parts of a nation’s cultural heritage.” Id. para.
92. However, the court made no reference to the right to freedom of expression. The
argument of “the general interest in protecting creations of the mind from commercial greed”
was used instead, with reference also to the freedom of the arts. Id. para. 65. For comments
on this judgment, see Martin Senftleben, Vigeland and the Status of Cultural Concerns in

Trade Mark Law—The EFTA Court Develops More Effective Tools for the Preservation of
the Public Domain, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 683 (2017); Thomas
H. Nicholson, EFTA and EEA: Is a (Famous) Work of Art Contrary to Accepted Principles
of Morality or Public Policy Under Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive?, KLUWER

TRADEMARK BLOG (Sept. 4, 2017), http://trademarkblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/09/04/eftaeea-famous-work-art-contrary-accepted-principles-morality-public-policy-article-3-trademark-directive/ [https://perma.cc/CBS7-SXXT]. More generally, on the insufficiency of
current trademark protection of the general interest in keeping public domain works free,
see Lotte Anemaet, The Public Domain is Under Pressure—Why We Should Not Rely on
Empirical Data When Assessing Trade Mark Distinctiveness, 47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP.
& COMPETITION L. 303 (2016); Geiger & Pontes, supra note 235.
ECtHR, Csibi v. Romania (dec.), No. 16632/12, 4 June 2019,
CE:ECHR:2019:0604DEC001663212.
“Szekelyfold nem România!” in Hungarian.
ECtHR, Csibi v. Romania (dec.), no. 16632/12, June 4, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0604
DEC001663212, para. 7.
Id. para. 8.
Id. para. 35.
Id. para. 41.
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Concerning the necessity of such an interference, the ECtHR
refused to “speculate whether the applicant aimed in reality to use the
trademark in question in order to promote his campaign for the creation of
a Szekler state.” 257 The court observed that the applicant’s complaint “[did]
not relate to political speech but only refer[red] to the proceedings related
to the domestic authorities’ refusal to register a trademark” and that “the
applicant limited his application to these proceedings, . . . [and] the
arguments related to his alleged political activities were only raised by the
Government after the communication of his application.” 258
The court further noted that “the applicant was involved in a
commercial activity and had used on several types of products the text for
which he had sought registration as a trademark.” 259 Thus, the ECtHR
appeared to accord particular weight to the fact that the object of the
applicant’s complaint was the refusal of his trademark “to be used in a
commercial activity,” 260 and not in any other type of speech meriting elevated
Article 10 protection, such as political or other general interest speech.
In view of this consideration, the ECtHR found that “the domestic
judges did not overstep their broad margin of appreciation when they found
that public reasons outweighed the applicant’s eventual right to freedom of
expression.” 261 It also ruled that “the applicant has not proved that the refusal
to register the trademark in question had had any impact on his possible
commercial activities.” 262 The court, therefore, concluded that “the refusal
of registration was . . . proportionate in the circumstances of the present
case, which disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention” and rejected the application as manifestly ill-founded. 263
Nonetheless, the seemingly prudent stance of the Strasbourg Court
on the impact of trademark-registration refusals on the free speech rights of
trademark applicants might not be a final say on the issue, at least not for all
trademark registrations, particularly, insofar as “immoral” trademarks
(rather than trademarks contrary to public order) are concerned. Indeed,
the Strasbourg Court’s case law generally suggests greater tolerance towards
speech that “offend[s], shock[s] or disturb[s].” 264 According to the court,
“[s]uch are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. para. 42.
Id.
Id. para. 43.
Id.
Id. para. 44.
Id. para. 45 (citing ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015,

CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para. 55).
Id. para. 46.
ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom,
CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, para. 49.
263
264
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5493/72,

Dec.

7,
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without which there is no ‘democratic society.’” 265 Hence, at least in theory,
any future challenge of registration refusals of “immoral” rather than
criminal-law-violative trademarks before the ECtHR might lead to a
radically different outcome than that reached in the Csibi case.
For instance, in one of its recent pronouncements on the
permissibility of restrictions on commercial speech on public-morals
grounds, the ECtHR found in favor of the “speaker.” 266 In particular, the
court held that the imposition of a fine on a clothing company 267 for using
images of Jesus and Mary in its advertising campaign was not sufficiently
justified.
Then again, it is unlikely that the ECtHR will rule that offensive
trademarks should always be registered, as the court usually adheres to a
case-by-case approach. The ECtHR is also unlikely to allow the registration
of trademarks that can be deemed to undermine other values protected by
the Convention—as might be the case regarding, for example, racist signs or
messages. Hence, there are many reasons to suggest that, in Europe, the
approach to the freedom of expression implications of the refusal to register
trademarks on morality or public policy grounds is likely to be far less
“radical” than that recently taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court in Matal v.
Tam 268 and Iancu v. Brunetti. 269 In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that refusing to register the so-called “disparaging,” “scandalous,” or
“immoral” trademarks violates trademark applicants’ free speech rights,
protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Lately, the CJEU has also addressed the issue. Until recently, the
General Court of the CJEU—one of the two courts of the judicial branch of
the European Union alongside the CJEU itself—had always rejected
applicants’ free expression arguments for “immoral” trademarks. The
General Court reasoned that such applicants had either failed to properly
argue that the refusal of their application was not covered by limitations on
freedom of expression provided in Article 10(2) of the ECHR, 270 or that the

265

Id.

ECtHR, Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, no. 69317/14, Jan. 30, 2018,
CE:ECHR:2018:0130JUD006931714.
The company was fined under the Lithuanian Law on Advertising that prohibited
advertising contrary to public morals.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
Case T-232/10, Couture Tech Ltd v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market
[OHIM], para. 71 (July 2, 2019), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
69cc3bfd-9f24-44c9-9995-dd2ed51e5709 T-232/10. This case involved the OHIM’s refusal
to register the Soviet coat of arms as a Community trademark because of the ban on former
USSR symbols in certain E.U. Member States.
266
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refusal did not prevent the applicants from continuing to market their
products with the signs in question as non-registered marks. 271
The latest in the line of such cases decided by the Court of Justice
in February 2020 has, however, changed this trend. 272 The case concerned
the refusal by the E.U. Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to register the
word-sign “Fack Ju Göhte” as contrary to the accepted principles of morality
because the word “fack ju” (identical to the English expression “fuck you”)
was expected to be perceived as shocking and vulgar by the German
public. 273 The sign referred to the title of a successful German comedic film
produced by the applicant, the Constantin Film Produktion company. In a
decision from January 2018, the CJEU’s General Court habitually rejected
the trademark applicant’s freedom of expression claim, adding that “a
constant concern to preserve freedom of expression” which is present “in
the field of art, culture and literature . . . does not exist in the field of trade
marks.” 274 The Court of Justice, where the case was appealed, has, however,
explicitly discarded the General Court’s argument. 275 According to the Court
of Justice, “freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must . . . be taken into account
when applying Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation No 207/2009 [the ground for
refusal related to public policy or to accepted principles of morality].” 276
See Case T-417/10, Cortés del Valle López v. OHIM, para. 26 (Mar. 9, 2012), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010TJ0417 (available only in French and Spanish) (noting
that OHIM’s refusal to register the figurative mark, “¡Que buenu ye! Hijoputa,” was
perceived as an inherently offensive and shocking expression by the Spanish public of the
E.U.); Case T-54/13, Efag Trade Mark Co. v. OHIM, para. 44 (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144483&pageIndex=
0&doclang=DE&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2750488 (available only in French
and German) (OHIM’s refusal to register a figurative sign with the words “FICKEN
LIQUORS” as it is considered to be a vulgar and obscene term in German).
Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual
Property Office [EUIPO] (Feb. 27, 2020), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=223843&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=2550080.
This was the general ground for refusal of Article 7(1)(f) of the E.U. Trademark Regulation
No. 207/2009, in effect at the material time (currently Article 7(1)(f) of Commission
Regulation 2017/1001).
Case T-69/17, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual
Property Office [EUIPO] (Jan. 24, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=198722&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=2550306 (appeal before the Court of Justice) (available only in French and
German).
Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual
Property Office [EUIPO], para. 56 (Feb. 27, 2020), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=223843&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=2550080.
271

272

273
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This was also the position of the Advocate General who, in his
opinion on this case, found that “[f]reedom of expression does indeed play
a role in trade mark law.” 277 Hence, to regard freedom of expression as
irrelevant to the field of trademarks (as held by the General Court) is “clearly
incorrect.” 278
Nonetheless, by apparently suggesting that the free speech rights of
trademark applicants must be balanced against the need to preserve public
morals or other competing interests in each particular case, both the
Advocate General and, following him, the Court of Justice appear to have
taken a more cautious position than that adopted by U.S. courts. Thus, no
automatic restriction on free speech can be imposed on trademark law
provisions prohibiting registrations of immoral marks and other marks
contrary to public policy. 279 The Advocate General has also suggested that
“although freedom of expression, as well as other fundamental rights
potentially at stake, must be taken into account in the overall balancing
exercise, the protection of freedom of expression is not the primary goal of
trade mark protection.” 280
The CJEU’s position can, thus, be characterized as being much in
line with the ECtHR’s approach towards the freedom of expression
challenges to refusals of trademark applications. Contrary to the position
taken in the U.S., in Europe, the approach would greatly depend on the
circumstances of each particular case, such as, the mark’s “offensiveness,” 281
the severity of harm to freedom of expression of the trademark applicant, 282
and so on. 283
Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual
Property Office [EUIPO], para. 47 (July 2, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf;jsessionid=4232D93A774C5379B6048FC908A5423C?text=&docid=215701
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7290447 (opinion of
Advocate General Bobek).
Id. para. 57.
Id. paras. 56–57.
Id. para. 57.
For example, in the case of a Lithuanian clothing company, the ECtHR gave particular
consideration to the public authorities’ failure to justify why the reference to religious symbols
in advertising was offensive. ECtHR, Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, no. 69317/14, Jan. 30,
2018, CE:ECHR:2018:0130JUD006931714, para. 79.
Arguably, fining a company for its advertising campaign amounts to a direct punishment
of expression; whereas, the refusal of trademark registration is rather a measure to discourage
certain speech and does not rise to the level of a direct ban on expression. For further
discussion on the degree of harm caused to freedom of expression by any potential refusal
of trademark registration, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Non-Traditional Trademarks and Inherently
Valuable Expression, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL TRADE MARKS 337
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., 2018).
For a comparative approach between the United States and the European Union, see
Geiger & Pontes, supra note 235.
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IV. RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COPYRIGHT
ENFORCEMENT AND AS A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS
The intellectual property issues that arose before the Strasbourg
Court regarding the right to privacy—guaranteed by the right to respect for
private and family life found in Article 8 of the ECHR—concerned: the
manner of executing certain search orders on allegations of copyright
violation (Section IV.A) and the possible extension to moral rights of Article
8 of the ECHR (Section IV.B).

A. Search Orders and Their Effects on the Right to the Respect for Private
Life
The Strasbourg Court first examined the compatibility of search
orders (as measures against copyright infringement) with the Convention’s
privacy provision in Chappell v. United Kingdom 284 in 1989. The case
concerned a challenge to the issue and execution of an interim relief known
as an “Anton Piller order” 285 to search the applicant’s premises that served
as both his office and home and to seize property that was subject to civil
copyright infringement proceedings. Following the applicant’s unsuccessful
attempts to set the order aside, he applied to the EctHR, arguing, first, that
the Anton Piller orders, as they existed in English law, were in breach of
Article 8 of the ECHR. Under the same provision, he further contested the
way in which the order was served and how the subsequent search was
carried out in his case.
In particular, he alleged that the grant and the execution of the
order were neither in conformity with English law nor proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, that is, the protection of the rights of others under
the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR. The applicant mainly relied
on the fact that the two searches—one regarding the “pirated” videos and
another concerning obscene ones—were allowed and conducted at the same
time, which allegedly distracted him from properly supervising the
execution of the order.
In its March 1985 decision on the admissibility of the application,
the European Commission of Human Rights dismissed the applicant’s
complaint about the legitimacy of Anton Piller orders, considering that it
was not called upon to examine, in the abstract, whether a particular aspect
ECtHR, Chappell v. United Kingdom, no. 10461/83, Mar. 30, 1989,
CE:ECHR:1989:0330JUD001046183. On this case, see Ann Sherlock, European Court of
Human Rights—Execution of an “Anton Piller Order” and Article 8, 14 EUR. L. REV. 476
(1989); Lawrence Collins, Anton Piller Orders and Fundamental Rights, 106 LAW Q. REV.
173 (1989); Ruth B. Charteris, Sun Sets on Dawn Raids, 34 SCOTS L. TIMES 271 (2000).
Named so after a case in which its use was approved by the Court of Appeal. See Anton
Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd. [1976] 1 All ER 779 (appeal taken from Eng.).
284

285
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of domestic law was or was not in conformity with the Convention. 286
However, the Commission referred the applicant’s complaint to the
Strasbourg Court because of the manner in which the order was executed
in his particular case.
The court, judging on the merits, held that there had been no
violation of Article 8. 287 According to the EctHR, the interference with the
applicant’s home and privacy could be justified under Article 8(2) as aiming
to protect the plaintiffs’ copyright against unauthorized infringement. The
court noted that the grant and the execution of the Anton Piller order in the
applicant’s case complied with English law. The basic terms and conditions
for the grant of the order were laid down with sufficient precision to be
foreseeable. 288 As such, the order was accompanied with adequate and
effective safeguards against arbitrary interference and abuse. 289 Those
safeguards included a short term grant for the execution of the order,
restrictions regarding the time and the number of persons by whom the
order could be executed, and a specified purpose for which seized materials
could be used.
Moreover, a variety of remedies were available to the applicant in
case of any wrongdoing by the plaintiffs. Although the court admitted that
the mode of execution could be considered “unfortunate and regrettable” 290
as it involved certain shortcomings in procedure, 291 it nevertheless concluded
that the grant and execution of the order were necessary and proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued.
However, the court reached a different conclusion in two much
more recent applications where violations of Article 8 had been established.
The applicants in the first case, 292 Mr. and Ms. Prezhdarovi, were a married
couple who ran a computer club in their garage. On February 2, 2005, the
Chappell v. United Kingdom (dec.), App. No. 10461/83 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Mar. 14,
1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2210461/83%22],%22itemid%22
:[%22001-57459%22]}.
ECtHR, Chappell v. United Kingdom, no. 10461/83, Mar. 30, 1989,
CE:ECHR:1989:0330JUD001046183, para. 67.
Id. paras. 52–57.
Id. paras. 59–61.
Id. para. 63.
These included the fact that Mr. Chappell was not afforded a proper opportunity to refuse
entry to his premises and the fact that his premises were searched, simultaneously, by the
police and the plaintiffs.
ECtHR, Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, Sept. 30, 2014,
CE:ECHR:2014:0930JUD000842905. On this case, see Dirk Voorhoof, European Court of
Human Rights: Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, 10 IRIS 1(Oct. 1, 2014), http://merlin.obs.coe.int/
article.php?id=15036 [https://perma.cc/KV7M-F2XB]; Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, GLOBAL
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, https://globalfreedomofexpression.
columbia.edu/cases/prezhdarovi-v-bulgaria/ [https://perma.cc/69ZB-MYN3] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2020).
286

287

288
289
290
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district prosecutor ordered a search of the applicants’ club upon suspecting
that they had installed some games on the computers they were renting to
their clients without the necessary software license for reproduction and
distribution. 293 To execute the prosecutor’s order, on February 21, 2005, the
police searched the club and seized five computers containing computer
programs, computer games, and films. Thereafter, criminal proceedings
against Mr. Prezhdarov were instigated. 294
Afterwards, a report on the inspection was sent to a judge who
approved it and briefly noted that there were pressing circumstances that
justified an immediate search and seizure as the only means by which the
necessary evidence could be collected and preserved. 295 Mr. Prezhdarov’s
application against the search and seizure operation, including a claim that
the computers contained letters and personal information about friends and
clients, was considered inadmissible. 296 In the subsequent criminal
proceedings, Mr. Prezhdarov was convicted of unlawful distribution of
computer programs, computer games, and movies. 297 The computers, which
had been retained during the criminal proceedings, were also confiscated.
The applicants complained to the EctHR, claiming that the
circumstances in their case were not sufficiently pressing as to justify an onthe-spot inspection and search and seizure of their computers. They further
maintained that the operation was unnecessarily extended to cover private
information contained in the retained computers, which Ms. Prezhdarova
had used for her business activities. Lastly, the applicants complained that
they had been denied access to an effective remedy in this regard. 298
Ruling on a violation of the second paragraph of Article 8 of the
ECHR, the court found that the actions of the police at the applicants’
computer club and the subsequent retention of the computers as an
interference with the applicants’ private life were not in accordance with the
law. 299 Assuming that the actions of the police had some basis in domestic
law—because the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 provided that, in
certain circumstances, the police could conduct search and seizure
operations 300—the court nevertheless held that the law did not provide
adequate safeguards against arbitrary conduct.

ECtHR, Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, Sept. 30, 2014, CE:ECHR:2014:
0930JUD000842905, paras. 12–13.
Id. paras. 15–17.
Id. para. 20.
Id. para. 21.
Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 54.
Id. para. 51.
Id. para. 44.
293
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The EctHR first noted that the circumstances of the case were not
so exigent as to buttress an immediate police action outside the criminal
proceedings, particularly because of the lapse of time between the
prosecutor’s order and the actual police inspection. 301 It further held that the
retrospective judicial review of the search provided no meaningful reasoning
for the lawfulness or justification of the impugned measure. 302 Finally, the
court concluded that the lack of any consideration of the seized
information’s relevance to the investigation and of the applicants’ complaint
regarding the personal character of some of the information stored on the
computers “rendered the judicial review formalistic and deprived the
applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse.” 303
The court also found a breach of the “quality of law” requirement 304
from Zosymov v. Ukraine, 305 which concerned a police night search on
suspicion of copyright infringement of the applicant’s office, car, and garage.
As in the previous case, the search was conducted without prior judicial
authorization. 306 Unlike in Prezhdarovi, however, judicial review was never
obtained even post factum. According to the Ukrainian rules of criminal
procedure, this was because “the relevant complaint could only be brought
within the framework of the criminal trial of the case initiated by the police
following the disputed visit, in the event that the investigative authority ever
brought the case to that stage.” 307 In the applicant’s case, however, the
criminal trial was never initiated, despite Mr. Zosymov’s numerous efforts,
and the relevant criminal proceedings remained stagnant for several years. 308
301
302
303

Id. para. 45.
Id. paras. 47–48.
Id. para. 49.

As a rule, the ECtHR examines four central questions when an exception to one of the
qualified Convention rights (such as the right to privacy) is at stake: (1) whether there has
been an interference with that right; (2) whether it is in accordance with law (the “quality of
law” requirement); (3) whether it pursues a legitimate aim; and (4) whether it is necessary in
a democratic society and proportionate to that aim. In the ECHR, the following rights are
qualified: Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life); Article 9 (freedom of thought,
conscience and religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); and Article 11 (freedom of
assembly and association). An analogous four-part test is applied when restrictions on the
right to property are at stake (Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR). For a further
discussion, see Steven Greer, The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FILES NO. 15 (1997). Regarding the right to property,
see Aida Grgić, Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar & Ana Vilfan, The Right to Property Under
304

the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Its Protocols, in HUMAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOKS, NO. 10 (2007).
ECtHR,
Zosymov
v.
Ukraine,
CE:ECHR:2016:0707JUD000432206.
Id. para. 61.
Id. para. 61.
305

306
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According to the Strasbourg Court, in this situation, “domestic law did not
provide requisite guarantees against arbitrariness in respect of the police’s
actions . . . and did not meet the requirement of quality of law for the
purposes of the Convention.” 309

B. Moral Rights Grounded in the Convention’s Right to Privacy
Legal scholars are of the opinion that moral rights—even without
any case law on point—could be protected by Article 8 of the Convention
on the protection of privacy. 310 The fact that the Strasbourg Court advanced
certain arguments in support of moral rights based on Article 8 in relation
to trademarks reinforces this contention.
The case at issue concerned a dispute in connection with the right
of reproduction of the portrait and name of the applicants’ greatgrandfather, a prominent factory owner, in the brewery’s trademark. 311 The
applicants passed a copy of the portrait to the local museum, which, in turn,
passed it to the brewery. In the action brought against the brewery, the
applicants asked to remove their ancestor’s name and portrait from the beer
advertisements because those interfered with their right to confidentiality of
family life. 312 The domestic courts, in all instances, dismissed the applicants’
complaints. As a result, the applicants applied to the ECtHR, alleging that
the commercial use of their ancestor’s portrait and name caused them
distress, which encroached on their private and family life under Article 8
of the ECHR.
The Strasbourg Court found that there had been no interference with
the applicants’ human rights. First, the court observed that “the applicants
had themselves passed the portrait to the museum,” 313 which led the court
to conclude that “they had agreed, in principle, that the portrait may be seen
by others.” 314 The ECtHR further noted:
[T]he portrait was posted on produce of the brewery once
founded by the applicants’ ancestor. In the Court’s opinion, by
using the portrait in this manner the brewery meant to revere his
memory as a master brewer rather than insult the applicants’

Id. para. 62.
See, e.g., Josef Drexl, Constitutional Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights in the European
Union—Between Privacy, Property and the Regulation of the Economy, in HUMAN RIGHTS

309
310

AND

PRIVATE LAW: PRIVACY AS AUTONOMY 173–74 (Katja S. Ziegler ed., 2007); Geiger,

“Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 5, at 383.

ECtHR, Vorsina v. Russia (dec.), no. 66801/01, Feb. 5, 2004,
CE:ECHR:2004:0205DEC006680101. On this case, see Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 694.
Id. para. 2.

311

312
313
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feelings towards him. Nothing suggests that the rather distant ties
between the applicants and the relative were thereby distorted. 315
Welkowitz observed that “the court’s finding that the use was not
undignified indicates that a less dignified use (and the court did not define
what that would be) might have led to a different result.” 316 Thus, the
reasoning of the court points to a quasi-moral-rights argument that might, in
the future, receive further development under ECtHR case law on Article 8
and copyright law. This is probable since, in certain countries, the link
between moral rights and personality rights is very clear. For example, in
Germany, moral rights are described as “‘authors’ personality rights”
(Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte). 317
V. NON-DISCRIMINATION: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR COPYRIGHT
RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF BUSINESSES AND PATENT
APPEAL PROCEEDINGS
The last right in the catalogue of ECHR material guarantees that
came into play in the context of intellectual property rights is the right to
non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR. In the IP context,
this guarantee was raised before the Convention institutions only on two
occasions.
The first pertained to the above-discussed dispute brought to the
Commission of Human Rights by the Dutch publisher of weekly “general
interest’” magazine, De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. 318 Apart from the freedom
of expression claim, the publisher also invoked Article 14 of the ECHR,
contending that it was discriminated against because under the national
broadcasting and copyright legislation, broadcasting organizations and some
publishers were allowed, unlike the applicant company, to publish complete
program information or at least summaries thereof. 319
As to the alleged discrimination between the applicant company
and the broadcasting organizations, the Commission took into
consideration the nature of the broadcasting organizations, which, although
performing a public service, were companies created under private law. 320
They were allocated broadcasting time in relation to their membership and
315

Id.

Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 694.
Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 5, at 386 n. 72.
D.G.P.N.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. July 6, 1976),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%225178/71%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-3155%22]}.
Id. para. 2.
Id. para. 101.
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the number of subscriptions to their program magazines. 321 The profits from
those subscriptions were also used for financing the broadcasting activities
of the organizations. 322 The European Commission of Human Rights,
therefore, considered that there were reasonable justifications for the
differential treatment. 323
As to the alleged discrimination against the applicant company
when compared to daily newspapers and newspapers appearing at least
three times a week, the Commission found that there had been no
differential treatment due to the incomparable features of these two kinds
of press publications. 324 In particular, it pointed out that the applicant
company sought to publish complete lists, and not merely summaries of
programs, whereas the other newspapers were allowed to publish only the
short summaries. 325 Finally, the Commission rejected the allegation of
discrimination involving foreign weekly magazines. It held that, even
assuming that the publications of the applicant company and the foreign
magazines were comparable, they nevertheless pursued different aims. On
a reciprocal basis, foreign publications were allowed an exchange of
program information with broadcasting organizations abroad in order to
serve those segments of the public who were interested in foreign
broadcasts. 326 Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 14 of the
ECHR. 327
The second occasion on which the Commission was called upon to
consider intellectual property regulation in light of Article 14 concerned a
case in which the applicant company challenged the fact that the appeal
procedure in patent disputes was different from the appeal procedure in
other disputes of a pecuniary nature. 328 In this case, unlike in the previous
case, the Commission did not even examine whether a different treatment
was justified by a legitimate aim, having found that the claimed
discriminatory circumstances were not comparable. 329 Additionally, since
Article 14 of the ECHR only applied to differences between parties whose
situations were analogous, the applicant company’s complaint was rejected
as manifestly ill-founded. 330

321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id.
Id.
Id. para. 102.
Id. paras. 104–05.
Id. para. 105.
Id. para. 107.
Id. paras. 108–09.

B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2226684/95%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-28112%22]} (available only in French).
Id. para. 3.
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VI. FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEES APPLICABLE TO IP PROCEEDINGS
Apart from material guarantees, the ECHR also provides a number
of procedural safeguards, at the center of which—without doubt—stands the
right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The cases concerning fair
trial are the most numerous in the Strasbourg Court’s practice on IP. These
cases involve aspects of the previously mentioned procedural guarantee,
such as: the right of access to court (Section VI.A), the finality of court
decisions (res judicata) (Section VI.B), the tribunal’s independence and
impartiality (Section VI.C), the equality of arms and the adversarial nature
of the proceedings (Section VI.D), rules on the administration of evidence
(Section VI.E), the oral nature of a hearing (Section VI.F), the right to a
reasoned judicial decision (Section VI.G), the right to a reasonable duration
of the proceedings (Section VI.H), certain further safeguards applicable in
the context of criminal proceedings (Section VI.I), and, finally, the right to
an effective remedy 331 and timely enforcement of a final court decision
(Section VI.J). Although a comprehensive overview of all instances of the
interaction of IP with different aspects of the right to a fair trial would go far
beyond the scope of this article, some of the most prominent examples can
still be highlighted. 332

A. Access to Courts
The right of access to the courts played a role in several intellectual
property cases decided by the ECtHR in relation to the issues of prohibitive
time-limits, 333 certain formal aspects of the appeals procedure, 334 questions of
The right to an effective remedy is, strictly speaking, a guarantee in its own right and is
enshrined separately from the Convention’s fair trial provision (Article 6) in Article 13 of the
ECHR. Note, however, that these two guarantees are closely interrelated, and the E.U.
Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example, even places them together within the scope of
the same clause (Article 47 of the Charter).
For further discussion of the intersection of IP and fair trial in Europe, see, an excellent
article by Jonathan Griffiths, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to a
Fair Trial, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 5, at 438.
Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 18, 1994),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2223016/93%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-27230%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); ECtHR, AEPI S.A. v. Greece, no.
48679/99, Apr. 11, 2002, CE:ECHR:2002:0411JUD004867999 (on copyright) (available
only in French); ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 33883/06, Apr. 12, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306 (on copyright, discussed infra text accompanying
notes 340–356); and ECtHR, Sobczynski v. Poland (dec.), no. 358/04, Sept. 30, 2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0930DEC000035804 (on patents).
Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. May 18, 1994),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2223016/93%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-27230%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); Denev v. Sweden, App. No.
331

332

333
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jurisdiction, 335 allegedly excessive court fees, 336 legal costs, 337 and unduly
protracted proceedings. 338 Finally, in a number of patent cases, the applicants
similarly challenged the impossibility of appealing the decisions of the
Board of Appeal of the EPO to national courts. 339
A recent copyright judgment in the case of Gheorghe v. Romania 340
provides a good illustration of how timeframe restrictions can impede
effective access to judicial protection. In Gheorghe, the applicant was a
professional photographer who took a number of photographs of
landscapes in Călăraşi County in Romania in 1984. 341 Although the
photographs had been commissioned for commercial publication in an
album, the album was not published, and the photographs were retained by
a certain F.G., who was in charge of the album project. 342 In 2004, the
applicant found out, by chance, that an album had been published in 1999
by a company run by F.G., with F.G. credited as the photographer. 343 In
February 2004, claiming F.G. had committed copyright infringement, the
applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Romanian Copyright Office

25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2225419/94%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]} (on
designs).
ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004,
CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (on copyright) (available only in French).
X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]} (on patents, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 357, 359–361); ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98,
Dec. 13, 2001, CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898 (on patents) (available only in French,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 358, 362).
ECtHR,
Jensen
v.
Denmark,
no.
8693/11,
Dec.
13,
2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD000869311 (on designs, discussed infra text accompanying notes
363–371).
ECtHR,
Kristiansen
v.
Norway,
no.
25498/08,
May
2,
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808 (on patents, discussed infra text accompanying notes
372– 379).
Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2227410/95%22],%22itemid%22: [%220
01-2868%22]}; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept.
9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],% 22itemid
%22:[%22001-4410%22]}; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:
[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4408%22]}; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v.
Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204.
ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 33883/06, Apr. 12, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306.
Id. para. 6.
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(RCO). He also joined a civil action to his criminal complaint, seeking
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 344
Following an investigation establishing that the applicant’s copyright
had indeed been infringed, the RCO forwarded the applicant’s complaint
to the police in November 2004. 345 Although the expert report ordered by
the police also confirmed the applicant’s authorship of the photographs, the
prosecutor’s office decided not to open a criminal investigation on the
grounds that the copyright infringement limitation period of five years
(calculated from the date on which the offense was committed) 346 had
expired in April 2004. The applicant appealed the decision before the trial
court, which ruled in his favor. 347 In particular, the court noted that the
five-year-limitation period should have been calculated from the date on
which the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO—which was about
two months before the end of the five-year term—and not the date on which
the RCO forwarded the file to the police.
The court’s conclusion was informed by the specific procedure for
prosecuting copyright offenses in Romania, whereby only the RCO (and not
the applicant) can commence a criminal action for copyright infringement.
This term calculation was, nevertheless, rejected on appeal by the higher
court, 348 which held that the limitation period continued to run until the date
on which the police received the criminal complaint from the RCO in
November 2004, which was more than five years after the offense had been
committed. 349 In reaching this conclusion, the higher court made no
reference to the civil complaint lodged by the applicant.
The applicant then appealed to the ECtHR, which found that the
domestic courts’ restrictive interpretation of the limitation period for lodging
the copyright infringement claim had deprived the applicant of access to a
remedy that would have enabled him to obtain the compensation claimed.
While stressing that “the requirement to lodge a judicial claim within a
statutory time-limit is not, in itself, incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention,” as this requirement serves the legitimate aims of legal certainty
and proper administration of justice, 350 the court nevertheless noted that “the
right of access to court is impaired when the rules cease to serve [those

344
345
346
347
348
349

Id. para. 8.
Id. para. 10.

In the present case, that date was the publication of the album in April 1999.
Călăraşi County Court, judgment of November 24, 2005.
Bucharest Court of Appeal, judgment of February 17, 2006.

Id.

ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no.
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306, para. 27.
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aims]. . . and form a sort of barrier preventing the litigant from having his or
her case determined on the merits by the competent court.” 351
Applying these rules to the facts of the applicant’s case, the ECtHR
ruled that the date that should have been taken into account by the domestic
courts was the date when the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO,
not the date when that complaint was forwarded by the latter to the police. 352
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that the time it took for
the RCO to conduct an investigation could not be imputed to the
applicant. 353 Furthermore, the procedural particularities of the Romanian
system for filing a criminal copyright infringement action did not allow the
applicant to file his complaint directly with the courts. 354 Finally, as it
concerned the applicant’s joined civil action, the court observed that the
domestic rules of criminal procedure required a criminal court to settle a
civil action once it decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings. 355 In
light of the above, the ECtHR concluded:
[T]he interpretation of the time-limit by the court of last resort,
followed by the non-examination of the joined civil claim,
precluded a full examination of the merits of the case and
impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a
court for the purpose of the determination of his civil rights and
obligations. 356
Additionally, two patent disputes examined the right of access to
courts in situations where the excessive costs of proceedings impede judicial
review of a case. In X. v. Switzerland, 357 the question was whether the denial
of free legal aid and the obligation to pay a large deposit in order to pursue
an action for damages in a patent infringement suit prevented the applicant
from accessing the courts. In the second case, Sté. MATROT v. France, 358
the issue was a civil defendant’s (the company, Sté. MATROT’s) inability
to appeal on points of law without paying significant damages awarded to
the claimant by the judgment the defendant intended to appeal.
In both instances, the applicants’ claims were rejected as manifestly
ill-founded. In relation to the first case, the Commission reiterated that high
costs of proceedings may raise an issue under Article 6(1) (fair hearing) of
351
352
353
354
355
356

Id. para. 28.
Id. para. 30.
Id. para. 31.
Id. para. 32.
Id. para. 33.
Id. para. 34.

X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]}.
ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98, Dec. 13, 2001,
CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898 (available only in French).
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the Convention in certain circumstances. 359 The Commission of Human
Rights, nevertheless, relied on the national court’s finding that the action for
damages in the applicant’s case was without any prospect of success. 360 The
Commission further considered that the amount of the deposit was not
disproportionate to the size of the claim. 361 With respect to the second case,
the court similarly found that the requirement to pay damages was
proportionate in view of the commercial nature of the dispute, the manner
in which the damages were calculated, and the applicant company’s failure
to provide any evidence of its financial situation. 362
An interesting case pertaining to the legal costs of proceedings and
their proper allocation—a separate issue under the right of access to court—
came under the scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court in December 2016. In this
case, the applicant, Mr. Jensen, had been condemned to pay legal costs of
an unspecified amount. 363 He was convicted in Denmark for violating
intellectual property rights involving the marketing of substantial quantities
of counterfeit designer goods such as knives, lamps, and similar products. 364
The judgment, which was read aloud to the applicant, stated that he had to
pay legal costs, including the lawyers’ fees. The applicant did not appeal that
judgment. However, in 2010, he was informed that the legal costs he had to
pay amounted to approximately 77,000 euros—a decision which the
applicant appealed to the High Court of Denmark. 365 He claimed that the
costs had to be paid entirely or partly by the treasury. His appeal was
dismissed because it was lodged after the statutorily allotted time limit. 366
According to the high court, the time-limit for an appeal (fourteen days)
should have been calculated from the moment the applicant was informed
of the decision that he had to pay legal costs, even if he only later learned
how much the legal costs amounted to. 367 This was because the appeal
concerned the order to pay the legal costs and not the actual amount of the
legal fees.
The applicant appealed to the ECtHR, complaining about the
system of imposing a duty to pay legal costs in a judgment without specifying
the amount. The court, however, rejected his claim, holding that there had
X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]}.
Id. at 158.
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ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98, Dec. 13, 2001,
CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898, para. 1 (available only in French).
ECtHR,
Jensen
v.
Denmark,
no.
8693/11,
Dec.
13,
2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD000869311.
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Id. para. 21.
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been no violation of Article 6(1) (access to court) of the ECHR. 368 It
essentially endorsed the decision of the Danish High Court, observing that
the appeal did not concern the amount of fees he was ordered to pay but
solely his duty to pay his legal costs. 369 It thus followed that the time limit ran
from the date of the judgment and not from the date when the applicant
learned of the exact amount of the fees.
Despite the applicant’s argument that he could not effectively apprise
himself of his duty to pay the legal costs because he was not aware that the
legal costs would be so burdensome, the court observed that he still could
have argued those costs had to be paid by the treasury even without knowing
the exact amount owed. 370 Since the applicant did not lodge such an appeal
until the expiration of the time limit for doing so, the Danish High Court’s
dismissal of his appeal was a foreseeable reaction. The court further
observed that the applicant also had an opportunity to lodge a complaint
about the exact amount of legal costs, and the time limit for such a complaint
would have started to run from the date on which the applicant had been
informed of that exact amount. 371 The applicant had, however, chosen not
to do so.
Moving further, Article 6(1) of the ECHR may also be breached
where the length of domestic proceedings renders the applicant’s right of
access to courts illusory. The case of Kristiansen v. Norway 372 is a good
illustration. It concerned a refusal by the Norwegian Industrial Property
Office (NIPO) of a patent application almost eighteen years after the
application was filed. 373 By that time, had a patent been granted in Norway,
its protection would have expired just two years later since, according to the
Norwegian Patents Act of 1967, a granted patent could be maintained for
up to twenty years from the filing date of the patent application. 374
Before the ECtHR, the applicants complained that only when the
NIPO had given its final decision rejecting their patent application were they
in a position to institute judicial proceedings to have the matter reviewed by
the courts. 375 This was, however, practically meaningless by that time, given
the twenty years’ limitation on patent protection under the Patents Act. The
ECtHR held that this situation had indeed amounted to a violation of Article
6(1) of the ECHR (access to court). 376 In view of the average processing time
368
369
370
371
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Id. para. 37.
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Id. para. 42.
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CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808.
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of two to three years, the Norwegian Government’s argument that the patent
authorities could not have evaluated the applicants’ patent application
earlier failed to convince the court. 377
The ECtHR also noted that, although one of the applicants
contributed to the length of the proceedings, this was not solely his
responsibility, and substantial delays were attributable to the NIPO. 378 It,
therefore, followed that, in a situation of administrative delay, the rule
limiting patent protection to twenty years from the date of filing undermined
the possibility of establishing patent rights through judicial remedies. 379
Finally, the lack of judicial review of the EPO’s decisions gave rise to a series
of applications to the ECtHR on the right of access to the courts. 380
Nevertheless, the Convention organs dismissed these cases as inadmissible
on grounds identical to those advanced in cases involving property claims
as discussed above—notably, because of “equivalent protection” provided by
the European Patent Convention. 381 The court also emphasized that, by
deciding to not register patents domestically in a number of European
countries and choosing to utilize the EPO registration scheme, the
applicants accepted the limitation on access to courts in the various
domestic systems. 382

B. Res Judicata
Another fair trial guarantee—the principle of finality of court
decisions, or res judicata—was examined at length in two cases against
Romania which concerned the quashing of a final court judgment in the
377
378
379

Id. para. 54.
Id. paras. 54–56.
Id. para. 57. Having reached this conclusion, the court did not find that any separate issue

arose in relation to the requirement under Article 6(1) of the Convention that national
proceedings be concluded “within a reasonable time” (on this aspect of the right to a fair trial,
see infra Section VI.H).
Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%2
2001-2868%22]}; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept.
9,
1998),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%
22itemid%22:[%22001-4410%22]}; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabv
iew%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4408%22]}; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v.
Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204.
See supra Section II.C.
That limitation, in turn, was considered to be proportionate to the legitimate aim of
ensuring an effective European system of registration of patents. See, e.g., Lenzing AG v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97, para. 1, (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-4408%22]}. For a critical assessment of a lack of judicial control over the EPO, see
sources cited supra note 157.
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applicant companies’ favor following an application for nullity lodged by the
General Prosecutor of Romania. One of those cases was a dispute over
exploitation rights for the translation of a novel, 383 and another involved the
right of exclusive use of the applicant company’s trademark. 384 In both cases,
a violation of Article 6(1) (res judicata) and the applicants’ property rights
(Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) was established because an application for
nullity lodged by the public prosecutor, who was not a party to the
proceedings, amounted to an extraordinary remedy contrary to the
principle of legal certainty. 385

C. Independence and Impartiality
Several IP cases before the ECtHR questioned a tribunal’s
independence and impartiality. 386 The most indicative is the BritishAmerican Tobacco case, 387 in which the applicant company challenged the
institutional structure of the Netherlands Patent Office, arguing that the
office failed to provide an independent and impartial tribunal, particularly
with regard to the manner of appointment of its members. British-American
Tobacco maintained that the members of the Appeals Division and the
Examination Division were part of the same administrative body—the Patent
Office—and were appointed on an interchangeable basis for each individual
case by the Central Division of the Patent Office. 388
ECtHR, SC Editura Orizonturi SRL v. Romania, no. 15872/03, May 13, 2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203 (available only in French).
ECtHR, SC Parmalat Spa v. Romania, no. 37442/03, Feb. 21, 2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0221JUD003744203 (available only in French).
ECtHR, SC Editura Orizonturi SRL v. Romania, no. 15872/03, May 13, 2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203, paras. 61–64 (available only in French); ECtHR, SC
Parmalat
Spa
v.
Romania,
no.
37442/03,
Feb.
21,
2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0221JUD003744203, paras. 25–28 (available only in French).
ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005,
CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (on copyright) (available only in French); Smith Kline
v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. July 10, 1991), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2212633/87%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-73574%
22]} (on patents); ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92,
Nov. 20, 1995, CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992 (on patents, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 387–397); ECtHR, Binder v. Germany (dec.), no. 44455/07, Sept. 20,
2011, CE:ECHR:2011:0920DEC004445507 (on patents).
ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, Nov. 20, 1995,
CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992. On this case, see Burkhart Goebel, Trademarks as
Fundamental Rights—Europe, 99 TRADEMARK REPORTER 931, 937 (2009); Griffiths, supra
note 332, at 443; Catarina Holtz, Due Process for Industrial Property: European Patenting
Under Human Rights Control, at 131, 132, 156, 207 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Rättsveternskapliga institutionen).
ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, Nov. 20, 1995,
CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992, para. 68.
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The composition of the Appeals Division was entirely left to the
discretion of the Central Division, without any possibility for third parties to
object. 389 There was no formal guarantee against dismissal or suspension. In
this respect, the applicant company referred to a case in which a member
of the Patent Office who refused to carry out an order by his superior was
dismissed. The British-American Tobacco company submitted, finally, that
Dutch law did not provide for the possibility to appeal a decision of the
Appeals Division to a tribunal that satisfied the Convention’s fair trial
requirements and that the proceedings before the Appeals Divisions were
not transparent. 390
The case was first examined by the European Commission of
Human Rights. The Commission held that, although there was no
manifestation of any personal bias on the part of the members of Appeals
Division of the Patent Office, its organizational structure failed to
demonstrate the objective appearance of impartiality. 391 Furthermore, it had
not been shown that the Dutch civil courts had ever considered themselves
competent to review the decisions of the Appeals Division. 392 The
Commission, therefore, concluded that the applicant company’s case was
not heard by an independent and impartial tribunal, and it had not been
established that a remedy before such a tribunal was available to the
company. 393
The Strasbourg Court, however, disagreed with the Commission’s
opinion in a judgment of November 1995. 394 It noted that, although no
Dutch civil court had ever held itself competent to review the decisions of
any Division of the Patent Office regarding patent applications, it could not
be inferred from this—absent a ruling to the contrary—that the civil-court
remedy was “ineffective.” 395 Accordingly, the applicant company had the
possibility, under domestic law, to bring the case before civil courts in order
to establish whether the Appeals Division was a “tribunal” offering
safeguards required by Article 6(1) of the ECHR (fair hearing). If the civil
courts found that the Appeals Division failed to meet the ECHR standards,
they would have had full jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the patent
application. 396 Since the applicant company chose not to avail itself of the
389
390
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B. Co. v. Netherlands, App. No. 19589/92 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 19, 1994),
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judicial remedy, irrespective of its reasons thereof, the Strasbourg Court
concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR (fair
hearing). 397

D. Equality of Arms and Adversarial Proceedings
The Convention institutions considered the right to adversarial
proceedings and equality of arms only on two occasions, both involving
Finnish patent proceedings. The first case, decided in 1997, concerned the
refusal of an applicant company’s patent application before the Finnish
Board of Patents and Registers on the grounds that the invention lacked the
requisite inventive character. 398 It appeared that the Finnish Board’s organs
had mentioned in their decisions a document filed by an interested third
party, which had not been previously communicated to the applicant
company. On that basis, the applicant company alleged that the principle of
equality of arms had not been respected. 399
Another case, decided some eighteen years later, pertained to the
civil proceedings initiated by an applicant who sought compensation for a
patent license. 400 In accordance with the patent law in force at the time of the
hearing, the Finnish District Court appointed two technical experts to
provide expertise. The experts’ report was, however, only delivered to the
parties together with the District Court judgment, thereby excluding the
possibility of commenting on the report.
In the Convention organs’ opinion, none of the situations
amounted to a violation of the principles of equality of arms or adversarial
proceedings. According to the Strasbourg Court and its former
Commission, in both instances, the applicants had the opportunity to
submit their comments in their subsequent appeals to the courts 401 or higher
judicial bodies. 402 Accordingly, any alleged procedural error before the
patent office or the trial court could have been corrected through the later
judicial proceedings.

397

Id. paras. 86–87.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on
H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document
%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}.
Id. para. 64.
ECtHR, Vazvan v. Finland (dec.), no. 61815/13, Nov. 3, 2015,
CE:ECHR:2015:1103DEC006181513, para. 4.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94, para. 74 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:
[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}.
ECtHR, Vazvan v. Finland (dec.), no. 61815/13, Nov. 3, 2015,
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E. Administration of Evidence
Several cases on intellectual property implicated the rules on the
administration of evidence—another procedural guarantee of the right to a
fair trial. 403 From these cases as well as from the court’s general body of case
law on the questions of evidence, one can infer that, in an overwhelming
majority of situations, the court abstains from interfering with the way
domestic courts handle evidence. According to the ECtHR, “[t]he
admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law
and, as a rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before
them.” 404 The Strasbourg Court’s task is limited to “ascertain[ing] whether
the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken,
were fair.” 405 The case of Kessler v. Switzerland is a good example. 406
In Kessler, the applicant, who was the president of an animal
protection association, published two articles in the association’s magazine
criticizing the practice of fishing with live bait. In the articles, the applicant
used four drawings taken from the fisheries magazine, Petri Heil, without
indicating their source and without requesting prior permission for the
publication of the drawings—an act that subsequently resulted in his
conviction for copyright infringement. 407
In his application to the ECtHR, the applicant complained, among
other things, that the domestic courts did not consider some of the evidence
and arguments advanced by him, including evidence on the applicability of
quotations and news reporting exceptions to copyright infringement and on
the general public interest in the contested publication. 408 At the outset, the
court reiterated that the admissibility of evidence was primarily a matter for

B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%2200128112%22]} (on patents) (available only in French); ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.),
no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004, CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (on copyright,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 406–412) (available only in French); ECtHR, Dima
v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (on
copyright) (available only in French).
See, among many other authorities, ECtHR, Ramanauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no.
74420/01, Feb. 5, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0205JUD007442001, para. 52.
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ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004,
CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (available only in French).
The High Court of the Canton of Thurgau (Tribunal supérieur du canton de Thurgovie)
ordered the applicant to pay 1,390 euros as compensation for the unauthorized use of
protected works. See Judgment of 6 July 1999, upheld on appeal by the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court (Tribunal fédéral), judgment of 15 March 2000.
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regulation by national law 409 and observed that the judgment in the
applicant’s case
was taken following the adversarial proceedings during which the
applicant was able to challenge the grounds put forward by the
opposing party and to submit the arguments he considered
relevant to his case. The courts have assessed the credibility of
the various items of evidence submitted in the light of the
circumstances of the case and duly gave reasons for their
decisions in this connection. 410
In the ECtHR’s opinion, it “[did] not appear that these courts have
drawn any arbitrary conclusions from the facts submitted to them or have
exceeded the limits of a reasonable interpretation of the legislation
applicable to the present case.” 411 It thus followed that the applicant’s
complaint had to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 412

F. Oral Hearing
In a number of patent cases, the Strasbourg Court discussed the
entitlement to an oral hearing as one of the instances of the right to a fair
trial. 413 The absence of an oral hearing in the appellate stage of patent validity
proceedings was contested in B.A.T. v. Switzerland 414 and was found to be
justified by the highly technical and purely legal nature of the proceedings
in question. 415 The Commission also stressed that the applicant’s claim did
not concern the absence of an oral hearing throughout the entire
proceedings but only for one instance, and the fact that the hearing took
place at the trial court level justified the absence of an oral hearing on
appeal. 416 Similarly, the court found that the possibility of lodging a further
409
410
411
412

Id.
Id. (translation from French by the authors).
Id.
Id.

Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2,
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}; B.A.T. v.
Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4,1996), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-28112%22]}
(available only in French); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No.
23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2,1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview
%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}.
B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-28112%22]} (available only in French).
Id. para. 2.
Id. For further discussion of the entitlement to an oral hearing under Convention case law,
see EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
(CIVIL LIMB) paras. 249–56 (2019), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_
Art_6_ENG.pdf.
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appeal with the court sufficiently remedied the lack of an oral hearing in the
patent application proceedings before the national patent office. 417

G. Reasoned Judicial Decision
The right to a fair trial also encompasses the important guarantee
of a sufficiently reasoned judicial decision. The Strasbourg Court has
addressed this in the intellectual property context on a number of
occasions, 418 some of which even resulted in a finding of violation of Article
6(1) of the ECHR (reasoned judicial decision). This was the case, for
example, in the above-mentioned Dima v. Romania dispute. 419 Dima
concerned, apart from the alleged claim of a violation of the right to
property discussed in Section II.A.1, the Romanian Supreme Court’s
failure to address one of the applicant’s grounds for appeal relating to the
invalidity of an accounting expertise that led to a rejection of his copyright
claims by the lower courts. In the ECtHR’s opinion, insofar as that
submission was crucial to the outcome of the proceedings, it required a
specific and explicit reply, without which there was a violation of Article 6(1)
of the ECHR (fairness). 420 Similarly, the court’s failure to address the
applicant’s argument relating to her trademark’s priority amounted to a
violation of the Convention’s right to a fair trial. 421 Article 6 of the ECHR,
while not requiring a detailed answer to every argument, obliged the courts
deciding on the merits to give a reply to at least those submissions by an
applicant that were the subject of the argument. 422

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on
H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],
%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}, paras. 55–56.
Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 18, 1994), https://hudo
c.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-272
30%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); ECtHR, Balani v. Spain, no. 18064/91,
Dec. 9, 1994, CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491 (on trademarks); Denev v. Sweden,
App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]} (on designs);
ECtHR,
Dima
v.
Romania,
no.
58472/00,
Nov.
16,
2006,
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200 (on copyright) (available only in French).
ECtHR,
Dima
v.
Romania,
no.
58472/00,
Nov.
16,
2006,
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200.
Id. paras. 39–41.
ECtHR,
Balani
v.
Spain,
no.
18064/91,
Dec.
9,
1994,
CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491.
Id. paras. 27–28. By contrast, a failure of an administrative court to state reasons for
refusing the applicant’s appeal petition in the design registration proceedings was found
justified on consideration that, whenever the national law conditioned acceptance of an
appeal to a decision by the competent court—as was the issue in the applicant’s case—a simple
refusal or acceptance of the petition by that court was sufficient. Denev v. Sweden, App. No.
417
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H. Reasonable Time Guarantee
A great number of cases on the intersection of intellectual property
and the right to a fair trial concern the allegedly excessive length of
proceedings. When addressing this type of disputes, the ECtHR gives
“regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the
complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the
authorities dealing with the case as well as what was at stake for the
applicant.” 423
In the vast majority of such cases, the approach of the ECtHR is
largely the same as that applicable to any other type of (non-IP) dispute. A
few minor particularities exist only in the heightened technical complexity
of patent litigation and certain copyright and other IP cases, which might
serve as a justification for the otherwise excessive duration of the
proceedings. Thus, no violation of Article 6(1) (length) was found in Zhurba
v. Ukraine. 424 In Zhurba, the applicant worked in a company as a senior
engineer. He claimed compensation for his “innovative proposal” 425 that
consisted of the re-engineering of the heating system in the company, which
allegedly created significant savings for his employer. The ECtHR held that
the duration of the proceedings, which lasted four years and five months,
was not unreasonable mainly due to the “complexity of the controversial
intellectual property issues at heart of the dispute.” 426 Analogously, the
factual complexity of a copyright infringement dispute over unauthorized
reproduction of the applicant’s photographs in a travel guide by a Georgian

25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22
tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]}.
See, among many other authorities, ECtHR, Nemec v. Slovakia, no. 48672/99, Nov. 15,
2001, CE:ECHR:2001:1115JUD004867299, para. 34.
ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503.
The Civil Code of Ukraine recognizes an “innovative proposal” (раціоналізаторська
пропозиція), alongside literary works, computer programs, trademarks, etc., among the
subject matters of intellectual property rights. See Civil Code of Ukraine, No. 435-IV, of 16
January 2003, art. 420 (as amended up to 2 November 2016) (UA127) (available in
Ukrainian),
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/181865
[https://perma.cc/CFZ3-ZRFU].
According to Article 481(1) of the Code, “An innovative proposal is a proposal which is
recognised by a legal entity and which contains a technological (technical) or organizational
solution in any field of activity.” “The rights in innovative proposal vest in its author and the
legal entity to which such a proposal is submitted.” Id. art. 483(1). “The author of an
innovative proposal shall have the right to fair remuneration by the legal entity to which this
proposal is submitted,” whereas “[the] legal entity that has recognized an innovative proposal
has the right to use this proposal to any extent.” Id. art. 484 (translation from Ukrainian by
the authors).
ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503, para. 1.
423

424

425

426

2020]

SHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

607

company contributed, together with several other factors, to the finding that
the overall length of the less-than-four-year proceedings was not excessive. 427
By contrast, a violation of the reasonable-time guarantee was
established in Jamriška v. Slovakia, 428 where the applicant sought
acknowledgement of patent rights and compensation for two technological
improvements proposed by him to his employer. According to the court,
the proceedings in that case—which lasted, in relevant part, for five years and
ten months—although complex, were delayed mainly due to the failure of
the trial court to proceed with the case in an effective manner. 429
Accordingly, the technical complexity of the dispute was not enough to
justify its protracted duration.
It is worth mentioning that, in a number of intellectual property
cases where the applicants complained about excessive length of domestic
proceedings, the court’s analysis was not only from the perspective of Article
6(1) (fair hearing) but also from the standpoint of Article 13, which
guarantees the right to an effective national remedy. 430
ECtHR, Schrade v. Georgia (dec.), no. 9289/08, Feb. 2, 2016,
CE:ECHR:2016:0202DEC000928908, para. 29. The other factors taken into consideration
in this regard were: (1) the fact that the proceedings “were spanned over three levels of
jurisdiction, some of which were called to examine the case twice;” (2) the fact that the
applicant had contributed, by his own conduct, to certain delays in the proceedings, which
“were then validly stayed pending the outcome of the associated criminal proceedings;” and
(3) “the overall conduct of the authorities which [could not] be blamed for lack of due
diligence.” Id.
ECtHR,
Jamriška
v.
Slovakia,
no.
51559/99,
Oct.
14,
2003,
CE:ECHR:2003:1014JUD005155999.
Id. paras. 29–31.
See, establishing a violation of both provisions, ECtHR, Kuzin v. Russia, no. 22118/02,
June 9, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0609JUD002211802 (civil proceedings concerning the
recognition of the applicant’s copyright and an award of damages that lasted more than five
and a half years in one court); ECtHR, Abramiuc v. Romania, no. 37411/02, Feb. 24, 2009,
CE:ECHR:2009:0224JUD003741102 (available only in French) (alleging lack of an effective
remedy whereby the applicant could have raised a complaint based on the excessive length
of the two sets of proceedings in a patent infringement dispute); ECtHR, Mol v. Netherlands
(dec.), no. 10470/07, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC001047007 (proceedings in
a civil dispute concerning alleged infringement of intellectual property rights to a computer
program that lasted for more than fifteen years); ECtHR, Mirković v. Serbia (dec.), no.
40053/06, Mar. 23, 2010, CE:ECHR:2010:0323DEC004005306 (proceedings in a
copyright-related civil suit that lasted for more than six years); ECtHR, Zarubica v. Serbia
(dec.), no. 47250/07, May 11, 2010, CE:ECHR:2010:0511DEC004725007 (proceedings in
a copyright-related civil suit that lasted for more than six years).
For examples of cases where these two provisions were considered separately, see
ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007,
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503 (civil proceedings seeking to have the applicant’s
works declared “an innovative proposal” and to obtain remuneration that lasted four years
and five months before three levels of jurisdiction); ECtHR, Rapos v. Slovakia, no. 25763/02,
May 20, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302 (civil proceedings in a design dispute
that lasted more than twelve years before two levels of jurisdiction).
427
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As already discussed, the ECtHR’s approach to the resolution of the
length-of-proceedings disputes in the IP context does not differ substantially
from that in non-IP cases. 431 The case of Denev v. Sweden 432 stands out in
this general pattern. There, a finding of violation of Article 6(1) (length)
arose, mainly, not out of an assessment of the common criteria laid down
in the court’s case law but from the particular subject matter of the action.
The case concerned the proceedings before administrative courts, which
were decisive for the registration of the applicant’s design and normally took
one month at each level. In the applicant’s case, however, the administrative
court proceedings lasted for almost four years. 433 Complaining about the
excessive length of proceedings in his case, the applicant maintained that,
had his design eventually been registered, the protection afforded would
have been practically useless because it would have almost expired given the
five-year period of protection, calculated from the date of the filing of the
design application. 434 The Human Rights Commission agreed, holding that
there had been a violation of Article 6(1) (reasonable time). 435 It noted:
[S]pecial regard should be had to the fact that the registration of
a design—should it be granted—is valid for only five years from the
date of the filing of the application. In the light of the criteria
established by the case-law and having regard to the
circumstances of the present case, the Commission therefore
considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 436

I. Further Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings
While the above-discussed fair trial guarantees apply to both civil
and criminal proceedings, the ECHR provides some additional safeguards
to parties in criminal cases. These safeguards are also featured in a number

On the relationship between Article 6(1) (reasonable time) and Article 13 (effective
remedy) of the ECHR, see DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, ED BATES & CARLA
BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 570–72 (2d ed.
2009).
See Griffiths, supra note 332, at 443 (“There seems little obvious reason why the right to
a timely trial should be more likely to be breached in intellectual property proceedings than
in any other form of trial.”).
Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-46116%22]}. On this case, see Holtz, supra note 387, at 76, 172, 203, 393–94, 485.
Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94, para. 2 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998).
431

432

433

Id.
Id. para. 38.
Id. para. 37; cf. ECtHR, Kristiansen v. Norway, no. 25498/08, May 2, 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 372–379).
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of intellectual property decisions. 437 The most interesting example is likely
the guarantee of legality, which was at stake in Donald v. France discussed
above. 438 There, the applicants complained about—in addition to a violation
of their freedom to impart information—national courts’ restrictive
interpretation of the internal copyright exception allowing the reproduction
of artistic works for news reporting 439.
As already mentioned, the French courts ruled that the exception
in question (on which the applicants built their defense) was “inapplicable
to the creations of the seasonal fashion industries and articles of fashion” 440
depicted on the applicants’ photographs. According to the applicants, such
an interpretation “enlarged the scope of application of the offense of
counterfeiting,” 441 thereby running afoul of the principle enshrined in Article
7 of the ECHR that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to
an accused’s detriment. The ECtHR, however, refrained from intervening
with the interpretation of French law adopted by the national courts—
notably, the French Supreme Court—and reiterated that the Strasbourg
Court’s role was limited to verifying the compatibility of the effects of such
an interpretation with the Convention. The ECtHR observed:
[T]he Supreme Court decided on the scope of application of an
exception to the rule protecting the legitimate rights of authors.
The Court does not consider that there is any element in its
interpretation capable of constituting an infringement of the
principles laid down by Article 7 of the Convention. 442

On the rights of defense, see EVORA B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 32601/96 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 3, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22
:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4046%22]} (on trademarks); ECtHR,
Eskelinen v. Finland, no. 43803/98, Aug. 8, 2006, CE:ECHR:2006:0808JUD004380398 (on
trade secrets); ECtHR, Hanževački v. Croatia, no. 17182/07, Apr. 16, 2009,
CE:ECHR:2009:0416JUD001718207 (on software copyright). On the entrapment defense,
see ECtHR, Volkov v. Russia, nos. 7614/09, 30863/10, Mar. 26, 2015,
CE:ECHR:2015:0326JUD000761409 (on software copyright).
ECtHR,
Donald
v.
France,
no.
36769/08,
Jan.
10,
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French); see also discussion supra
Section III.A.2.
Article L. 122-5 9° of the French Intellectual Property Code of 1 July 1992,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=322949
[https://perma.cc/4JDS-R3V2]
(available in French).
ECtHR,
Donald
v.
France,
no.
36769/08,
Jan.
10,
2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 20 (available only in French, translation in 45
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 354 (2014)).
437
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Id.
Id. para. 23.
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J. Enforcement of a Final Judicial Decision
The last procedural guarantee that gave rise to a number of cases
involving intellectual property proceedings is the right to timely enforcement
of final court decisions. Thus, an eleven-year delay in enforcing a final
judgment that ordered a State-owned company to compensate the applicant
for an unauthorized use of his invention was found contrary to both Article
6(1) (enforcement of a final court decision) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(protection of property) of the ECHR. 443
On another occasion, a failure to enforce a final court judgment—
awarding the applicant royalties for the use of a patent—because of several
procedural errors committed by domestic courts had likewise resulted in a
finding of a violation of the Convention. 444 On the other hand, a delay of
almost five years in complying with a court judgment that required a private
debtor to pay the applicant damages for copyright infringement was not
deemed inappropriate under Article 6(1) of the ECHR because of the
private nature of the dispute and the applicant’s own failure to display the
necessary diligence in enforcing the judgment. 445
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the ECtHR’s approach to intellectual
property from the perspective of different human rights guaranteed in the
European Convention on Human Rights, which the ECtHR considers in IP
cases. So far, the central focus of the ECtHR in such cases has been on the
Convention’s property and freedom of expression clauses. With regard to
the former, the ECtHR made it clear that Article 1 of the First Protocol to
the ECHR applies to intellectual property, and its scope of influence is not
limited to disputes originating in a direct state action. According to the
ECtHR, the Convention is also applicable, in certain circumstances, to
private-party litigation. This is possible because of the horizontal effect of
the Convention that imposes on State Parties to the Convention the positive
obligation to ensure—primarily through their respective judicial systems—
that the individual rights protected by the Convention are not unduly
restrained.
However, as the right to property is among the rights to which the
margin of appreciation accorded to domestic authorities “usually deploys its
full effect,” 446 the national determinations on applicants’ IP rights are
ECtHR, Abramiuc v. Romania, no. 37411/02, Feb. 24, 2009,
CE:ECHR:2009:0224JUD003741102 (available only in French).
ECtHR,
I.D.
v.
Romania,
no.
3271/04,
Mar.
23,
2010,
CE:ECHR:2010:0323JUD000327104 (available only in French).
ECtHR, Cerăceanu v. Romania (no. 1), no. 31250/02, Mar. 4, 2008,
CE:ECHR:2008:0304JUD003125002 (available only in French).
Ducoulombier, supra note 159, at 46.
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unlikely to be overturned by the ECtHR, except in the case of a flagrant
violation. Since the scope of property protection is largely left to the
discretion of national legislatures, limitations in the public interest are likely
to be permissible in accordance with the concept of the social function of
property. The danger of excessive protection of IP rights by the Convention,
as is sometimes emphasized by some scholars, 447 should certainly not be
overlooked. 448
Similarly, regarding the right to freedom of expression and
information, the court has developed an extensive body of case law in the
area of intellectual property protection. In particular, it has allowed an
external freedom of expression defense outside the traditional internal
balancing mechanisms of copyright and trademark laws. At the same time,
the Convention system did not clearly exclude the possibility of bringing
forward an Article 10 argument in order to support an IP claim.
The Convention’s property and free expression provisions were,
however, not the only ones the ECtHR used to interpret the scope of IP
protection in Europe. Notably, the particular manner in which the remedies
for infringement could be exercised actuated the guarantees of the
Convention’s right to privacy. This became very clear on application of the
search orders based on a suspicion of IP infringement. Besides these rather
specific cases, it has also been demonstrated that the right to privacy has
broader—though still largely theoretical—implications for the area of moral
rights. Some case law has further emerged in relation to the right to be free
from discrimination.
In addition to material rights, the procedural guarantees of Article
6 of the Convention (fair trial) also apply to intellectual property disputes.
In many instances, consideration of the intellectual property claims brought
under this Convention provision does not differ substantially from any other
type of non-IP dispute. In certain situations, however, the particular nature
of IP rights and litigation is decisive for the final resolution of the case by
the ECtHR. 449
IP lawyers and judges must rethink and study more carefully the
role of the ECtHR’s judicial practice vis-à-vis the IP framework. This is clear
because of the already existing IP case law of the ECtHR that was the focus
of this article, the Court’s increased interest in approaching this type of
(essentially private law) dispute from the external human rights perspective,
See Robert Burrell & Dev Gangjee, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression—A Call for
Caution, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 544 (2010).
See Geiger, supra note 23, at 661.
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For the most remarkable example in the context of a reasonable time guarantee, see Denev
v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]}
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 432–436).
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and the recent developments in the European legal arena, including an
obligation of the E.U. to accede to the ECHR in the future. 450 Indeed, a
deeper understanding of the precise ways in which IP and human rights
interoperate can help to create a more balanced and nuanced system of IP
protection not only in Europe but also in other regions and countries
(including the United States) where human rights and constitutional rights
are recognized as fundamental values meriting the highest level of
protection.

See Article 6(2) TEU, as amended by Article 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon, and Article
59(2) of the ECHR, as amended by Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. Although
the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of E.U. accession to the ECHR (Opinion 2/13
of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the accession, which remains
binding on the E.U.
450

Mitchell Hamline Law Review
The Mitchell Hamline Law Review is a student-edited journal. Founded in 1974, the Law
Review publishes timely articles of regional, national and international interest for legal
practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers. Judges throughout the United States regularly
cite the Law Review in their opinions. Academic journals, textbooks, and treatises
frequently cite the Law Review as well. It can be found in nearly all U.S. law school
libraries and online.
mitchellhamline.edu/lawreview

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

